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Abstract
We present a practical protocol based on homomorphic cryptography for conducting
provably fair sealed-bid auctions. The system preserves the secrecy of the bids, even after
the announcement of auction results, while also providing for public veriﬁability of the cor-
rectness and trustworthiness of the outcome. No party, including the auctioneer, receives
any information about bids before the auction closes, and no bidder is able to change or
repudiate any bid. The system is illustrated through application to ﬁrst-price, uniform-price
and second-price auctions, including multi-item auctions. Empirical results based on an
analysis of a prototype demonstrate the practicality of our protocol for real-world applica-
tions.
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In recent years, auctions and electronic marketplaces have been used to facilitate
trillions of dollars in trade in the world economy [25]. Auctions, in particular,
are often adopted to promote the ideal of competitive pricing and economic ef-
ﬁciency [44,8]. Previously used for rare goods, or for time-sensitive goods (e.g.,
ﬂowers and ﬁsh), auctions can now be harnessed for all kinds of commercial trans-
actions [48]. Auctions see especially wide use for the procurement of goods and
services by ﬁrms and governments [23,31,77]. We also note that more and more
auctions of all kinds are electronic, and operate over the Internet, which reduces
the cost of participation and enables worldwide competition.
Individual procurement events in the private sector, for instance, the procurement
of truckload services by Procter and Gamble, approach US $1 billion in transaction
value [69]. To give a sense of the scale of procurement in the public sector, Asker
and Cantillon [5] estimate public procurement in the European Union at about 16%
of its GDP; by this estimate public procurement comprised $2 trillion of trade in
2006 [78]. Governments worldwide also use auctions to allocate property rights,
such as auctions for wireless spectrum [45] (with worldwide proceeds exceeding
US $100 billion by the end of 2001 [48]). In a typical week in February, 2006, the
U.S. treasury sells more than US $25 billion in three-month treasury bills through
a sealed-bid auction. 1 Sponsored search auctions drive over $1 billion in revenue
to Google each quarter [39], and the eBay marketplace reported a record US $44.3
billion volume in the 2005 calendar year, representing a 30% increase over 2004.
Why are auctions so popular? Trepte [77] emphasizes the role auctions play in
promoting competition. Competition, in turn, provides incentives for bidders to act
as ‘honest brokers’ of information, so that in the context of procurement the winner
is the most technically efﬁcient ﬁrm. Yet, auctions are only effective in promoting
competition if they are trustworthy, with all bids treated fairly and equally and all
bids are seen to be treated in this way [77]. In discussing the role of regulation in
the context of procurement auctions, Trepte emphasizes the importance of being
able to commit to an objective process, so that
“... the buyer binds himself in such a way that all bidders know that he will not,
indeed cannot, change his procedures after observing the bids, even though it
may be in his interest to do so.”
Schelling [71] had already noted “... it is a paradox that the power to constrain an
adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself.” In the context of auctions the
point is a simple one: the ﬁrm engaged in procurement would like to commit not to
advantage one ﬁrm over another to promote fair competition.
1 Generally sold in uniform-price auctions. See http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov
21.1 The Problem of Corruption
Auctions are not immune to corruption and this commitment to a correct process
can be hard to achieve. By corruption, we mean the auctioneer breaking the rules
of the auction in favor of some bidder(s), typically in exchange for bribes [40].
The possibility of corruption exists in an auction whenever the auctioneer is not the
owner of the goods for sale in the auction, or the owner of the ﬁrm that is seeking
to procure goods [40]. For instance, there is a possible conﬂict of interest when
the auction is operated by an individual within a large ﬁrm, or by a public servant
within a government organization [38].
As evidence of the extent of concern about corruption in competitive processes, the
main goal of governments and international bodies such as the World Bank, in reg-
ulating public procurement auctions, is to “curb the discretion” of the buyer [77].
TheWorldBankrecentlyestimatedthevolumeofbribesexchanginghandsforpub-
lic sector procurement alone to be roughly US$200 billion per year, with the annual
volume of procurement projects ‘tainted’ by bribes close to US$1.5 trillion [75],
and has made the ﬁght against corruption a top priority [21].
When price is the only factor in determining the winner of an auction, then many
authors argue that using an open and veriﬁable, sealed-bid auction should help to
prevent corruption [77,66,41]. In a sealed bid auction, bids are committed during
the bidding process and then opened simultaneously by the auctioneer and the rules
correctly followed to determine the winner (and price). However, it seems difﬁcult
in practice to ensure a fully trustworthy sealed-bid auction. The kinds of manipula-
tions that are possible in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction include the following:
 The auctioneer allows a favored bidder to improve on the bid of the winning
bidder (possibly the same favored bidder) by revealing information about other
submitted bids before the auction closes [41], or by inserting a bid for the favored
bidder after reviewing the submitted bids. This allows the favored bidder to win
at the best possible price.
 A favored winning or second-place bidder can be invited to change a bid after
the auction has closed in order to obtain a better price or win the auction, respec-
tively [47].
 Bribes can can be received before bids are made, in exchange for a promise
to modify the bidder’s bid to the bidder’s advantage should that bidder be the
winner [34].
Each of these manipulations relies on the ability to circumvent the intended sealed-
bid auction process. The ﬁrst method relies on learning information before the close
of the auction, or being able to insert or modify a bid after some bidders have
already bid. The second and third methods rely on being able to change, or cancel,
bids after the close of the auction.
3More than ethically troubling, corruption is undesirable because it can lead to
both an efﬁciency loss (e.g., with the wrong supplier winning a contract) and
also a distributional effect (e.g., with the government paying too much for a con-
tract) [3,21,34,47,18,14,15]. Corruption is a widespread, real-world problem, as
illustrated by the following examples:
 A 1988 U.S. investigation, Operation Ill Wind, into defense procurement fraud
resulted in the conviction of 46 individuals and 6 defense corporations, with ﬁnes
and penalties totaling US$190 million [14].
 Maﬁa families in New York City would sometimes pay bribes for an “under-
taker’s look” at the bids of other bidders before making their own bids when
bidding for waste-disposal contracts [34].
 In 1996, Siemens was barred from bidding in public procurement auctions in
Singapore for ﬁve years because they bribed the chief executive of Singapore’s
public utility corporation in exchange for information about rival bids [40].
 As many as 40–50 “information brokers” (buying information from oil compa-
nies and selling to suppliers) may be actively working at any given point of time
in the North Sea oil industry, with corruption and bid rigging affecting upwards
of 15% of contracts (an economic value of GB£1.75 billion per year in 1995) [2].
Driving home the difﬁculty of implementing truly sealed-bid auction processes, In-
graham [30] provides a remarkable account of corruption in New York City School
Construction Authority (SCA) auctions, an approximately US$1 billion per year
market. Two SCA employees and eleven individuals within seven contracting ﬁrms
were implicated in the corruption. A dishonest contractor would submit a bid well
below the projected price of the contract, and during the public announcements of
the bids, the auctioneer would save the favored bid until the other bids were opened
and announced. Knowing the current low bid, the dishonest auctioneer would then
read aloud a false bid just below the current low bid instead of the artiﬁcial bid
actually submitted. The bid form would subsequently be corrected with correction
ﬂuid.
Second-price auctions are robust against all three of these manipulations [47]. In a
second-price (Vickrey) auction the good is sold to the highest bidder for the second
highest bid price [79] (respectively, bought from the lowest bidder for the second
lowest bid price in a reverse auction such as a procurement auction). In a second-
price auction no single bidder can be given a special advantage because all bidders
have the same opportunity to match other bids via the auction rules. However other
(more complicated) manipulations are possible; e.g., the auctioneer can collude
with the two highest bidders, with the second highest bidder invited to withdraw
4her 2 bid upon the auction closing so that the highest bidder wins the auction but
has to pay only the third highest bid [41]. 3
Moreover, without additional assurances, second-price auctions are vulnerable to a
new kind of manipulation: when selling an item, an agent acting for the seller can
insert a shill bid below the highest bid after the close of an auction and drive up
revenue. 4
An almost universal conclusion, across the many papers in the ﬁeld, is that there is a
need for veriﬁably correct and trustworthy ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions [41,77,8],
with emphasis placed on the need for the process to be open and transparent. It is
apparent from the above examples that standard solutions, which rely on a well-
deﬁned and open process, with bids sealed until opened in public, and the use of
regulations and penalties, often remain inadequate. Indeed, Andvig [2] makes the
interesting point that even when an organization is successful in restricting access
to information before an auction closes, then, paradoxically, there are fewer people
that know enough to “police” the process and this can lead in turn to more oppor-
tunities for corruption.
1.2 Our Solution
Our solution ensures the correctness of a sealed-bid auction and allows veriﬁability
of correctness by any third party and without revelation of the bids received. The
solution extends to multi-item auctions and includes all popular variants of auction
2 For clarity of reference, we use “she”, “her”, etc. to refer to the bidders and veriﬁers,
and “he”, “his”, etc. to refer to the auctioneer (generally a prover), and other parties to the
auction.
3 Moldovanu and Tietzel [49] provide a remarkable account of a failed attempt by the
German author Goethe (1749–1832) to use a second-price auction to sell a manuscript.
Goethe set a reservation price p and instructed his agent to collect a bid b from Vieweg
(1761–1835), the propsective publisher, and to sell at p if and only if b  p. The story is
relevant here because his agent, legal counsel B¨ ottiger, deviated from the rules and revealed
to Vieweg the exact amount p. Vieweg subsequently bid p, and Goethe accepted the offer
but without realizing his desire, which was to learn about his true “worth” by running this
truthful auction.
4 Seeing problems with implementing truly sealed-bid auctions, one can also consider the
role of open auctions in which bids are “broadcast” to all participants; traditionally, this
would occur with all bidders in the same room but today an open auction can be conducted
over the Internet. Although open auctions may provide transparency and reduce opportu-
nities for manipulation, Lengwiler and Wolfstatter [41] conclude the open auctions may
not be desirable for the fear of bidder collusion. Other authors argue that open auctions are
often unsuitable for procurement, and other complex environments, because bidders need
time to formulate technical proposals [5,40].
5pricing rules, including ﬁrst-price and second-price. Correctness is ensured by pro-
viding complete secrecy of bids until the close of the auction (including, even, from
the auctioneer), assured revelation of bids to the auctioneer upon auction closing,
and veriﬁcation that the outcome (or the part of the outcome that the auctioneer
promises to verify) is correct through the use of cryptographic methods. None of
the aforementioned manipulations of ﬁrst-price or second-price auctions is possible
in our scheme.
An important factor in the practicality of cryptographic methods for providing
trusted auctions is having a clearly understandable and convincing solution, that
is accessible to knowledgable people who are nevertheless not experts on the intri-
cacies of cryptography and general zero knowledge proofs. In this regard, we as-
sume a public key infrastructure under which all parties possess public/secret key
pairs for digital signatures and use Pascal Paillier’s homomorphic encryption [55]
scheme to provide veriﬁable correctness and trustworthiness without revealing in-
formation about the bids. The cryptographic proofs are based on universally ac-
cepted assumptions.
We focus on two additional aspects of practicality. First, the auction will clear in
reasonable time and with reasonable communication requirements using commod-
ity hardware, even for a large number of bidders. Second, the computational archi-
tecture must be consistent with practical business models. To achieve this we focus
on proofs of correctness rather than secure computation. Unlike previous solutions,
e.g., Naor et al. [52], we require neither the existence of multiple auctioneers nor
that the auctioneers or bidders collaborate to conduct the auction. We believe that
a model involving a single auctioneer that is solely responsible for conducting the
auction and independent veriﬁcation of the auction by third parties is more realistic
from a business perspective.
We have carefully examined the role of all parties in a sealed-bid auction and for-
malized their role in a cryptographically sound protocol. In addition to a seller,
multiple bidders, and an auctioneer, our model employs two commercial entities:
notariesprotectbiddersbyactingaswitnessestothesubmissionofbids—primarily
to prevent the auctioneer from ignoring or modifying submitted bids, and a Time-
Lapse Cryptography Service [62] provides a cryptographic commitment protocol
that prevents bidders from refusing to reveal commitments they make during the
auction protocol. The Time-Lapse Cryptography (TLC) Service is used to keep
bids secret before the close of the auction. The TLC service publishes a public
key before the auction begins, and delays the creation of the corresponding secret
decryption key until after the close of the auction.
The auctioneer creates an appropriately certiﬁed Paillier public/secret key pair to be
used for the security of the bids after the auction, and publishes both this public key
and the time-lapse public key in the auction rules. Bidders ﬁrst encrypt their bids
using the auction’s public key, then re-encrypt these encrypted bids using the TLC
6Service’s public key, and ﬁnally submit the doubly encrypted bids to the auction.
This ensures that the auctioneer will be able to decrypt the bids, but only after the
TLC Service’s secret decryption key is revealed after the auction closes.
Whereas earlier methods required the auction to be distributed across the com-
puters of multiple, independent auction operators, or required complex interactive
protocols involving computation by bidders and the auctioneer, our solution has
a simple, non-interactive, and familar computational architecture. Bidders prepare
commitments to their bids and send the commitments to the auctioneer and any
witnessing notaries. The auctioneer opens the commitments (but can do so only af-
ter the auction closes), determines the outcome of the auction and publishes proofs
of its correctness. In return for this simplicity, we do not achieve all of the same
privacy guarantees as earlier solutions [37,52,29,43].
We choose not to protect against the revelation of bid information by the auctioneer
after the close of the auction. In our view, while an important area of research, the
algorithmic and software methods currently available for solving this problem are
too cumbersome and challenging to understand to ﬁnd wide business applicability.
Moreover, we consider this kind of manipulation to be less insiduous because it
does not facilitate corruption during the auction. No information can be leaked by
any party before the auction closes, and after the auction closes no new bids can be
introduced and no bids can be altered. We also note that even when bid values stay
concealed from the auctioneer at great process complexity cost, a determined ad-
versary can try to spy and obtain information on a rival’s bid using corrupt insiders.
Thus, an absolute guarantee of secrecy is never attainable in real life.
Complete post auction-closing secrecy can be enforced, in cases where it is deemed
essential, by appeal to specialized hardware and monitoring software. A Trusted
Computing infrastructure, based on secure hardware and digitally signed software
(audited by third parties for correctness), installed in physically secure locations
with ongoing monitoring and auditing, can prevent the leaking of information with
high assurance [72]. In fact, with such deliberately opaque servers it is of the ut-
most import that an auction participant can independently verify the correctness of
the outcome of an auction and be assured that there is no fraud. Thus, such tech-
nological methods to eliminate secrecy leaks are very well complemented by our
methods for veriﬁable correctness.
While providing the secrecy of bid information is our primary focus, privacy of
bidder identities can be accomplished by other business or cryptographic protocols.
For example, bidders may use legal proxies to place bids on their behalf to hide
their identity, or the auctioneer may employ a cut-and-choose blinding technique
7(as described in Section 2.4.5) so that the mapping of winners to bidders is revealed
only where necessary by revealing the random blinding factors. 5
To demonstrate the scalability of our technology, we have conducted empirical tim-
ing tests (Section 5). We show that for acceptable strength of the cryptographic
security key, single or multi-item auctions with 100 bidders can be prepared in
around two hours of computation and veriﬁed in less than half an hour, all on a
modest (2.8 GHz Pentium 4) PC. We also show that the computations scale lin-
early with the number of bidders. Because our method is easily parallelizable, it is
possible to accommodate auctions with even tens of thousands of bidders in at most
a day of computation on a 64-node network of commodity PC’s. Over a decade ago,
Franklin and Reiter [26] also found that conducting cryptographic sealed-bid auc-
tions was possible on commodity computing hardware of the day, although their
protocol differs substantially from our own.
1.3 Additional Beneﬁts: Better Robustness to Collusion
Providing for veriﬁable and trustworthy auctions without revealing information
about bids brings another indirect beneﬁt. A major concern in the use of auctions in
practice is that of bidder collusion [68]. By collusion we mean bidders coordinating
in a bidding ring, with the intention to manipulate the ﬁnal price. The basic idea is
to bid jointly in order to limit competition, with the proceeds being shared among
members of the ring. 6
Collusion between bidders is an especially difﬁcult problem to address because it
necessarily exploits information asymmetries between the auctioneer and the bid-
ders, and is therefore hard to prevent and detect [77]. Unlike the recommendations
of the World Bank and other national and international agencies, our technology
allows for auction veriﬁcation without revealing information about bids, and this
provides further robustness against bidding rings.
As evidence of the problems caused by bidder collusion, consider the following
examples in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions:
 Multiple ﬁrms were convicted of participating in bidding rings in auctions for
school milk contracts in Florida and Texas in the 1970s and 1980s [56].
5 This point becomes important when proving the outcome of the auction; in the protocols
we describe, we do not attempt to keep secret that, say, bidder B3 was the winner, because
we assume B3’s true identity is already private if that is necessary.
6 Porter and Zona [58] note that joint bidding is typically illegal unless the speciﬁed work
could not be performed without the combined capabilities of the participating ﬁrms or if
the bidders could not be competitive individually.
8 Following allegations of bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the
Paciﬁc Northwest in the 1970s, an empirical study ﬁnds evidence for collusion
in auctions conducted between 1975 and 1981 [6].
 In1984,oneoftheﬁvebiggesthighwayconstructionﬁrmsinNewYorkstatewas
convicted in federal court of rigging bids in auctions for state highway contracts
on Long Island in the early 1980s. Four other ﬁrms were listed as unindicted
co-conspirators [58].
First-price auctions are preferred over second-price auctions because they are less
susceptible to collusion. 7 In ﬁrst-price auctions, bidding rings are only sustained
by the threat of punishment because members have to submit bids lower than their
truevalue.Biddingringsareunstablewithouttheabilitytoidentifyabidderthatde-
viates and without repeated interaction [65,28,30]. Indeed, Ashenfelter [4] suggests
that auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s keep the identity of buyers se-
cret to combat rings so that buyers can break from a ring and buy anonymously.
Yet, a common feature in every one of the aforementioned real-world auctions was
that the auction was concluded with the public opening of bids. As discussed by
Porter and Zona [58], this has an unfortunate side effect:
“The... policy of publicly announcing the bids and the identity of bidders al-
lows cartel members to detect deviations from cartel agreements. Undercutting
or cheating would not go unnoticed.”
Indeed, the World Bank’s own ofﬁcial Procurement Guidelines [75] state that,
“Bids shall be opened in public; bidders or their representatives shall be allowed
to be present... The name of the bidder and total amount of each bid, and of any
alternative bids if they have been requested or permitted, shall be read aloud (and
posted online when electronic bidding is used)...”
Why, one might ask, is bid information made public when it can enable bidding
rings to sustain themselves through credible threats of punishment? Trepte [77]
makes the reason very clear. While noting the value of “restricting the detail and
content of post-award information,” he adds that ”the existence of such information
is essential if disappointed buyers are to be able to challenge unfair or unlawful
procurement procedures.” For this reason, we argue that our solution may have im-
portant ramiﬁcations in terms of reducing opportunities for bidder collusion while
addressing corruption. Our auction protocol provides a balance of transparency,
trustworthiness and secrecy that reduces the potential for corruption while improv-
ing market efﬁciency.
7 In a second-price auction the collusive strategy is for the member of the ring with the
highest value to bid high and the rest of the members to bid low, or not at all. This is
stable because no member of the ring can do better through a unilateral deviation from the
collusive agreement [65].
9A related point can be made in the context of using our techniques to verify the cor-
rectness of second-price auctions. The main effect, of course, is that we enable a
trustworthy and veriﬁabily-correct auction process. This prevents, in particular, any
concern about the manipulation through shill bidding discussed earlier. But there
is also a second beneﬁt, that comes from not needing to reveal bid values in es-
tablishing that the auction process was correctly conducted. Second-price auctions
support truthful bidding in a dominant strategy equilibrium, usefully simplifying
the bidding process for participants. On the other hand, this bidding strategy can
have a number of unpleasant side effects when bids are revealed after the auction
closes. In the context of procurement, a supplier will be reluctant to reveal her true
cost basis to a competitor [67]. Similarly, when purchasing government assets such
as wireless spectrum, a bidder will be recluctant to reveal her true value for acquir-
ing assets to competitors. Governments may also be reluctant to reveal to the public
that the value of the highest bid was signiﬁcantly more than the revenue collected. 8
1.4 Related Work in Cryptography
Much of the previous work on the use of cryptography for conducting veriﬁably
correctandtrustworthyauctionshasfocusedonthegoalofcompleteprivacy,where
not even the auctioneer learns information about bids after the close of the auc-
tion [37,52,29]; see Brandt [11] for a recent discussion. This is typically achieved
through assuming two or more trusted third parties, either through numerous auc-
tioneers [29] or with asymmetric models in which the commerical entity of an
auction issuer is assumed in addition to the auctioneer [52,43]. Some protocols
achieve complete privacy through bidder-resolved multi-party computation [11]. In
comparison, we settle for veriﬁable correctness and trustworthiness in combination
with complete secrecy to all parties except the auctioneer; see also Franklin and Re-
iter [26], which employs “veriﬁable signature sharing”, requires an electronic cash
infrastructure, and distributes this trust in the auctioneer among a set of servers. As
discussed above, the auctioneer in our solution cannot learn any information about
bids until the auction has closed. In return we achieve a non-interactive 9 protocol
that is especially simple from a bidder’s perspective.
8 For example, when the New Zealand government conducted a Vickrey auction for
telecommunications licenses, it was revealed after the fact that the winner had been willing
to pay much more [45].
9 Interactive cryptographic auction protocols require the active participation of bidders
throughout the auction process in order to obtain the auction results, generally via multi-
party computation or related methods. Non-interactive protocols such as ours require no
such bidder participation; submission of bids is the only required bidder activity, and bid-
ders’ veriﬁcations of auction correctness can be performed with no additional interaction
with the auctioneer.
10In justifying the focus on computationally secure methods to provide correct and
veriﬁable auctions, it is interesting to note that achieving information-theoretic
guarantees on complete privacy is impossible in a single-item Vickrey auction [12],
at least when it is desired that the payment is only revealed to the winning agent.
(One cannot prove to another party that the winner’s payment was correct with-
out revealing information beyond that implied by the fact that this bidder had the
highest bid.)
For trusted third parties we require only notaries, who provide a lightweight “wit-
ness” service and are independent business entities that already exist in prac-
tice [73]. The level of trust in them is quite low, as they never possess any non-
public information. The Time-Lapse Cryptography Service functions as a trusted
third party, although Rabin and Thorpe [62] describe a TLC service that distributes
trust among many parties using secret sharing, so that there is no single completely
trusted party.
In addition to providing business realism (also see Lipmaa et al. [43] for a critique
of earlier methods), we choose to adopt standard methods from homomorphic en-
cryption combined with “cut and choose” test sets and eschew more complex cryp-
tographic ideas such as secure multi-party computation, obfuscation of circuits,
and oblivious transfer. As Bradford et al. [10] argue, many such complex proto-
cols, particularly those requiring the ongoing participation of bidders, suffer from
“protocol completion incentive problems”, in which bidders who know they have
lost or change their minds can disrupt the protocol and prevent the completion of an
auction. We intentionally avoid such problems by having a single partially trusted
auctioneer compute the outcome.
We share with Lipmaa et al. [43] (see also [1,7,11,74,20]) the use of homomor-
phic encryption, but seek a simpler solution through the use of a single auction-
eer in place of the two server model adopted in their work. In their protocol, the
seller and an auction authority, who are trusted not to collude, work interactively to
generate zero-knowledge proofs of correctness. Cachin [17] proposes a technique
based on homomorphic encryption in which a semi-trusted single auctioneer pro-
vides a means for two bidders to determine whose bid is higher in zero knowledge
(in fact, not even the auctioneer learns the bids). However, his extended protocol
for cryptographic auction similarly requires two auction servers which are assumed
not to collude. Nakanishi et al. [51] describe a similar protocol based on additively
homomorphic encryption and a set of auction servers who conduct a multi-party
computation. Such methods result in stronger privacy and secrecy properties at the
cost of this additional process complexity.
Rabin, Servedio and Thorpe [61] have recently proposed a somewhat different
cryptographic architecture suitable for conducting sealed-bid auctions with similar
properties that does not employ homomorphic cryptography. Instead, the system
11uses a statistically secure encryption scheme based on cryptographic commitments
and proves all computations correct to an arbitrarily low probability of error.
Earlier work on multi-item auctions either assumes distributed trust [33,20,1], or
adopts multi-party computation techniques [11], and the current state of the art
for secure combinatorial auctions is still not very scalable [80,74]. In compari-
son, our approach can be extended to secrecy-preserving multi-item auctions (pre-
sented here) and combinatorial auctions (reserved for future work). Speciﬁcally,
our trusted auctioneer can apply fast algorithms to the combinatorial optimization
problem in determining winners. The auctioneer must simply construct a proof that
the outcome is correct and need not involve multiple parties in computing the out-
come.
Whereas previous architectures use cryptography for anonymity, we note that exist-
ing real-world business entities (e.g., notaries as proxy bidders) also meet this need.
We therefore do not complicate our protocol with maintaining bidder anonymity
and consider it outside the scope of this work. Another practical issue, addressed
in previous work but not here, is that of noncoercibility [16,73] of an auction. Non-
coercibility prevents a bidder from being able to credibly claim to a third party that
it bid in a particular way after the close of an auction. Auctions with this property
are more resistant to bidding rings, since the stability of bidding rings in ﬁrst-price
auctions depends on being able to detect (and punish) deviations from agreed upon
rules.
2 Preliminaries
The standard auction model considers an auctioneer AU, bidders B = fB1;:::;Bkg,
and a seller. This is a forward auction in that the goal is to allocate one or more
items to some set of bidders. Reverse auctions, with a buyer rather than a seller,
are suitable for procurement auctions and can be modeled in a similar way. In a
single item auction, each bidder Bi is modeled with a private value vi; she bids to
maximize her net utility (which is vi  p, her payment, in the event that she wins
the auction.) In a ﬁrst-price, sealed-bid auction, each bidder Bi makes a bid Bidi.
This is a claim about her maximium willingness to pay. Bids are made without any
information about the bids (or values) of other bidders, and the item is sold to the
highest bidder, who pays the highest bid price. In a second-price sealed-bid auction,
the item is sold to the highest bidder, who pays the second highest bid price. 10 See
Krishna [36] for an introduction to auction theory.
10 As noted earlier, although more susceptible to collusive bidding behavior, second-price
auctions have the useful property that it is a dominant strategy for a bidder to report her
true value.
122.1 Desired Auction Properties
Based on the analysis in the introduction, we list desiderata for any sealed-bid auc-
tion process. These go beyond the standard economic goals, for instance, efﬁciency
or revenue maximization:
 Non-repudiation by bidders: Once a bidder submits a bid, her bid is provably
unalterable. Moreover, a bidder is bound to reveal her bid to the auctioneer after
the auction closing time.
 Non-repudiation by auctioneer: The auctioneer’s exclusion of a properly submit-
ted bid can be conclusively proven and thus becomes legally actionable.
 Trustworthiness: The auctioneer cannot know the bids until after the close of
the bid submission phase. Thus the auctioneer cannot collude with bidders by
sharing others’ bids during the auction.
 Secrecy: The bids are hidden to everyone until all bids are committed. At the
close of the auction, only the auctioneer knows any secret information. He may
keep the outcome secret, notifying only winners of their allocations and pay-
ments, or make any part of the outcome public by revealing some or all of the
allocations and payments and proving them correct. Revelation of these values
does not reveal other secret information not implied by the values themselves.
 Veriﬁable correctness: All information revealed, whether private or public, is
proven correct. Bidders receive a proof of the correctness of their own allocation
and payments. The public, including all bidders, receives a proof of correctness
for all public information about the outcome of the auction and also the validity
of bids. The auction protocol enforces correctness; an auctioneer will not be able
to present valid proofs for invalid winners or incorrect payments.
In achieving these properties we make standard cryptographic assumptions. Be-
cause the security of our encryption is related to the computational intractability of
solving “hard” cryptographic problems, longer cryptographic keys can be adopted
over time as computational hardware gets more powerful. This will maintain the
same level of realized security at comparable computational running time.
2.2 Real-World Components
We recall that our auction system comprises an auctioneer AU, bidders B =
fB1;:::;Bkg, and a seller. Bidders can also be proxies to provide anonymity. In
addition, we assume a universally accessible, tamper resistant clock (such as pro-
vided by the United States NIST time servers) and the following components.
132.2.1 Certiﬁed Bulletin Board
The auctioneer maintains a certiﬁed bulletin board. This can be a publicly known
website maintained and updated by the auctioneer. The auctioneer uses the bulletin
board to post all public information about the auction, including the initial auc-
tion announcement as well as (encrypted) information about bids that have been
submitted and proofs that can be used to verify all publicly available information
about the outcome. All posts to the the bulletin board will carry appropriate digital
signatures identifying their originators.
2.2.2 Notaries
Notaries are reputable agents, such as law ﬁrms, accountants, or ﬁrms specializ-
ing in providing a witness for bidders. When preparing to participate in an auction,
a bidder may select a set of notaries of her choosing from some set of notaries
possibly authorized by the auctioneer. Use of the notaries is optional; their only
purpose is to prevent a dishonest auctioneer from failing to post bid information
from disfavored bidders. In using a notary, whenever a bidder sends concealed bid
information to the auctioneer she also sends that concealed information to any no-
taries she has selected, most notably commitments to bids and random help values.
These notaries also submit this information to the auctioneer, and act as witnesses
in the case that a bidder complains that an auctioneer does not correctly post her
information to the bulletin board. We require that a majority of the notaries is not
corruptible. Note that our process is structured so that no information about the
actual bids is revealed to the notaries, and, again, their only role is to serve as wit-
nesses to the communications in the auction in case of a dispute between a bidder
and the auctioneer.
2.2.3 Time-Lapse Cryptographic Service
A bidder Bi, possibly in collusion with the auctioneer, might refuse to open her
commitment and reveal her encrypted bid E(Bidi). 11 One way to prevent this prac-
tice of bid repudiation is to employ a “Time-Lapse Cryptography Service” named
and described by Rabin and Thorpe in [62].
The Service will at regular intervals post a new cryptographic public encryption key
TPK (Time-lapse Public Key), and after a ﬁxed period of time post the associated
secret decryption key TSK (Time-lapse Secret Key). For our purposes, it sufﬁces
that the public key be available before the bids are to be submitted, and that the se-
cret key be released soon after the auction closes. We envision that the Service will
publish a constant stream of keys with appropriate lifespans for an auction, and the
11 The notation E(m) designates an encryption of a message m; see Section 2.5 for details
of the cryptographic notation we employ.
14Auctioneer selects and speciﬁes a key to be used that expires soon after the clos-
ing time of the auction. 12 For example, the Service might publish a set of public
encryption keys each hour, each with a different lifespan, e.g. three hours, one day,
one week, 90 days, etc. When the lifespan expires for a particular public encryption
key, the Service reconstructs and publishes its associated secret decryption key.
For our purposes, the Service must not employ any single trusted third party who
knows either the bid information or any secret key that could decrypt the encrypted
bid information before the close of an auction. Additional cryptographic details
about the TLC Service are provided in Section 2.4.4.
2.3 Overall Flow and Main Steps of Auction
Schematically, the auction process will proceed in three main stages (described
in more detail in Section 3). In the ﬁrst stage, the auctioneer posts the auction
announcement on the bulletin board. The announcement, to be detailed later on,
includes a deadline time T for submitting bids. In the second stage, the bidders
commit to the encrypted forms of their bids and random data but post bid informa-
tion in a form that is concealed even from the auctioneer. Notaries are engaged in
this stage and witness these commitments posted to the auctioneer’s bulletin board.
In the ﬁnal stage, the bidders must follow through and reveal the encrypted forms
of their bids to the auctioneer and the public. They do not decrypt or reveal their
unencrypted bids. The auctioneer and other bidders verify that these encryptions
of their bids are consistent with the posted commitments. The auctioneer then de-
crypts the bids in secret, and computes the outcome of the auction according to the
posted rules for that auction. He then posts the parts of the outcome to be veriﬁed
on the bulletin board, along with public proofs that the selection of the winner(s)
and their payments was done according to the auction rules. After the last posting,
any party can verify the correctness of the publicly veriﬁable part of the outcome.
A bidder can also privately verify the correctness of her individual outcome via a
proof offered by the auctioneer if that outcome is to be kept secret.
12 Rivest et al. [64] propose similar methods for cryptography with forced time release
where the user sends x to a time-released cryptography service, which returns Es(x) using a
secret key s; s is released at some future date. They also suggest eliminating the trusted third
party with threshold secret sharing as well as an “off-line” approach that does not require
the involvement of the Service. Other work on identity-based encryption, token-controlled
public key encryption, partial key escrow, and timed-release encryption solves this problem
in similar ways; see [62] for a review.
152.4 Basic Cryptographic Tools
Our system relies on universally accepted cryptographic tools. We describe the
tools we employ in our result, referring to other publications for established results
and providing proofs for new uses of existing tools. We will sometimes refer to
a “prover” P and a “veriﬁer” V when discussing the secrecy-preserving proofs of
mathematical facts relating to our auctions. See the Handbook of Applied Cryptog-
raphy [46] for a general introduction to the applied cryptographic techniques and
notation we employ.
2.4.1 Public Key Infrastructure
We assume cryptographically sound methods of establishing and exchanging pub-
lic keys used for all the cryptographic tools we employ, including the auctioneer’s
public/secret key pair for Paillier encryption and the public and secret keys pub-
lished by the time-lapse cryptography service. In addition, the auctioneer, notaries,
and all bidders require public/secret key pairs for digital signatures. The public sig-
nature veriﬁcation keys of all parties must be mutually known and certiﬁed. We
notate digital signatures as follows: AU can sign message x, generating SignAU(x).
A bidder Bi’s signature of x is denoted Signi(x).
2.4.2 Sources of Randomness
Cryptographic key generation and probabilistic encryption require a good source
of random data. We postulate bidders’ and notaries’ ability to create enough highly
random data to create strong key pairs and encrypt or sign a small number of values.
We further postulate that the auctioneer has a source of random data sufﬁcient to
encrypt large numbers of integers used in the secrecy-preserving proofs described
below. Such a source might be hardware that extracts randomness from radio static
or quantum noise in diodes. Such “hardware randomness generators” are already
employed in important cryptographic applications.
2.4.3 Secure Random Data
In order to prevent any party (including the auctioneer) from cheating by infusing
deliberately slanted random data into the cryptographic protocols, we require that
all bidders commit to a random data string when they bid, and that the auctioneer
post a commitment to a random data string in the auction rules. These strings are
revealed only at the close of the auction, and then combined using exclusive OR so
that even if just one of the strings is truly random, the combination thereof is also
truly random. We denote this auction random data string by X. The resulting string
16X is used to “tie the hands” of the auctioneer: when proving the correctness of the
auction, the auctioneer must reveal data exactly as speciﬁed by the bits in X.
The auctioneer publishes the algorithms to be used on data from the random data
string in the auction rules, for example, the method for choosing a random permu-
tation of integers in a speciﬁc range, which is employed in the course of proving
the auction results correct.
2.4.4 Time-Lapse Cryptography
The Time-Lapse Cryptography Service (introduced in Section 2.2.3) provides for
a binding and hiding commitment to bids (so that the bidder may not change her
bid and the auctioneer learns nothing about the bid from its commitment); it also
enforces the nonrepudiation of bids, so that once a bidder has committed to her bid,
she may not prevent the auctioneer from eventually decrypting it. We assume the
TLC service wherever we employ cryptographic commitments in our protocol, and
notate bidder Bi’s commitment to a value x as the time-lapse encryption ETPK(x).
Each bidder Bi commits to her encrypted bid by encrypting Z = ETPK(E(Bidi))
(where the bid is ﬁrst encrypted with the public key of the auctioneer), using a
time-lapse public encryption key TPK. The bidder then posts Signi(Z) on the bul-
letin board. After time T +1, the decryption key TSK associated with TPK will be
posted by the TLC service. The release of the decryption key TSK will enable the
auctioneer (and everybody else) to decrypt Z = ETPK(E(Bidi)) after time T +1
and thus obtain E(Bidi); this functions as the “decommit” operation—importantly,
out of the hands of the bidder.
Where time-lapse encryption of long strings is required, a symmetric block cipher
key is created and encrypted using the public TLC key, then published. Data are en-
crypted using the symmetric key; when the TLC secret decryption key is revealed,
the symmetric key can be recovered and the data decrypted. Thus the magnitude of
a time-lapse encrypted value x may be polynomial in the size of the TLC key given
the assumptions underlying time-lapse cryptography and any suitably secure block
cipher. We therefore assume any value in our protocol may be encrypted using a
TLC public encryption key.
2.4.5 Cryptographic Blinding
If privacy is to be enforced by the auctioneer, or in cases where it is necessary to
keep secret the number of parties allocated any items (Section 4.2.3), the Paillier
encryption scheme we use permits the transformation of a known encryption of a
value (ciphertext) into another ciphertext so that both decrypt to the same input
value (plaintext). To blind a Paillier-encrypted value, say, E(Bidi;r), the prover
computes a random blinding factor s2Z
n and computes snE(Bidi;r)E(Bidi;r
17s) (mod n2). This remains a valid encryption of Bidi, but only someone who knows
s or the secret decryption key f can prove that fact.
Blinding is well-complemented by a “cut-and-choose” protocol so that a prover P
constructs2vrandomblindingsofasetofvalues,thentheveriﬁerVasksforvofthe
sets to be revealed by revealing the random blinding factors used to construct them.
V then checks that each blinded set contains exactly the original set of elements.
For example, once the posted bids are on the bulletin board, the auctioneer creates a
number of blinded auctions, veriﬁes half of them to be correct, and then proves the
outcome of the auction on the other half. This keeps the original bidders’ identities
private.
The computational cost of blinding a ciphertext is almost equivalent to encrypt-
ing a plaintext, because the dominant computation is the modular exponentiation
required by both operations.
2.5 Homomorphic Cryptography for Secrecy-Preserving Proofs
We employ Paillier’s encryption scheme [55] to encrypt auction data. Paillier’s is a
homomorphic encryption system, in which the result of an operation applied to two
ciphertexts is a valid encryption of an operation (possibly the same one) applied to
their plaintexts. 13 In cryptography, a plaintext is the original form of a message, in
our case the integer representing a bid or quantity; a ciphertext is the encryption of
a plaintext.
Homomorphicencryptionschemesenablecomputationwithencryptedvalueswith-
out revealing any new information about the values themselves or the results of the
computation. Paillier’s system employs a public/secret key pair, n and f respec-
tively. The secret key n is the product of two large prime numbers p and q, and its
size is determined by the security requirements of the application. The secret key f
is (p 1)(q 1). A 1024-bit public encryption key is widely considered sufﬁcient
for security until 2010 [27]. Paillier encryption is also a probabilistic encryption
scheme. In particular, encryptions are performed with a random “help value” r that
is used to achieve semantic security: given two plaintexts and their encryptions, one
cannot tell which ciphertext corresponds to which plaintext without being able to
decrypt them. Semantic security is critical to preserve the secrecy of the bids both
during their initial encryption and during the veriﬁcation process, where both bids
and the values in the test sets, whose plaintexts are well known, must still remain
secret.
13 More formally, in a homomorphic encryption scheme, there exist operations  and 

such that given ciphertexts C1 = E(x1) and C2 = E(x2), C1 
C2 = E(x1 x2). Paillier’s
encryption scheme is homomorphic in that E(x1)E(x2) = E(x1 +x2). See Appendix A
for more details.
18The security of this scheme is founded on the “Decisional Composite Residuosity
Assumption” (DCRA) [55]. 14 The DCRA implies that if the public key n is difﬁ-
culttofactor,thenitisalsodifﬁculttotellwhetheraparticularnumberxisanumber
of the form x = rn (mod n2) for some r. This assumption is related to the widely
accepted assumptions underlying the security of RSA [63], ElGamal [24], and Ra-
bin [60] encryption, and is believed to be of similar computational intractability.
The Paillier encryption of a message x will typically be denoted E(x;r), where the
public key n is implicit and the help value r is made explicit. In discussion below,
the help value r will sometimes be omitted to simplify notation where it is implicit
or irrelevant, for example,C = E(x).
Wepresenthereasummaryofthepropertiesof,andextensionsto,Paillier’sscheme
we use in this paper. First, given only the encryption E(x1) and either another
encryption E(x2) or a public constant k, anyone can compute the encryptions
E(x1+x2), E(x1+k), and E(x1k) without learning anything about x1, x2, or the
secret key f. Second, a prover P who knows the secret key f can also prove a full
set of equality and inequality relations for two encrypted values E(x1) and E(x2),
e.g., x1 = x2, x1 > x2, etc., again, without revealing anything about x1 or x2. It is
also possible to compare encrypted bids to constants in a similar way. The last two
statements with respect to Paillier’s encryption will be proved next. We employ the
notation E(x)E(y) to mean “x  y can be proven using encrypted values E(x)
and E(y)” and the similar notation  (),  (<), and  (>). The veriﬁcation of
these comparisons is detailed in Appendix 2.5.1.
2.5.1 Secrecy-Preserving Equality and Inequality Proofs
Equality comparison. Given two ciphertextsC1 = E(x1;r1) andC2 = E(x2;r2), P
can prove x1 =x2 without revealing any additional information—most importantly,
the value of x1 or x2. Both P and V compute C0 = C1 C 1
2 (mod n2) = E(x1  
x2;r1=r2) = E(0;r1=r2). P then proves C0 is an encryption of zero as above by
revealing r1=r2.
Inequality comparison. Given two ciphertexts Cx = E(x) and Cy = E(y), P can
show x > y and x  y. Because our values x and y are integers mod n2, we can
prove x > y by showing x  y+1, provided y 6= n 1. Due to the homomorphic
properties of Paillier encryption, E(x+1) = E(x)(n+1) (mod n2), and so adding
1 to a value in its encrypted form is trivial. Thus, all ordering comparisons can be
reduced to the ability to prove x  y. We ﬁrst specify that x and y must be in the
range [0;2t) for 2t < n=2. This can be proven as described in Section 2.5.3. Then,
to prove x  y, both P and V calculate E(x y) = E(x)E(y) 1 (mod n2), and P
proves 0  (x y) < 2t < n=2 from E(x y). If in fact x < y, then (x y) will wrap
14 A number x = rn (mod n2) is known as an nth residue mod n2. Because n is a composite
number—the product of two primes—x is called a composite residue.
19around mod n2 so that (x y)  n=2 and no such proof is possible. This principle
is also detailed in Section 2.5.3.
We also mention that zero-knowledge proofs exist to prove, given only two Paillier-
encrypted values E(x) and E(y), that x 6= y without revealing whether x > y. We
omit the construction of such a proof because we do not require it in our protocol.
2.5.2 Secrecy-Preserving Proof of Encrypted Products
Because Paillier encryption does not enable the secrecy-preserving multiplication
of two encrypted values as it does addition, we require a method that allows a
prover P with three plaintexts u, v, and w such that uv = w (mod n) to prove this
fact to a veriﬁer V who has Paillier encryptions E(u), E(v), and E(w), respectively.
D˚ amgard et al. [22] propose another solution to this; the solution we present is in
the spirit of our other cryptographic primitives.
Deﬁnition 1 A Multiplication Test Set (MTS) for E(u;r), E(v;s), and E(w;t) is a
set of 8 elements:
fE(u1;r1);E(u2;r2);E(v1;s1);E(v2;s2);
E(wi;j) = E(uivj;pi;j) j i; j 2 f1;2gg
where u = u1+u2 (mod n) and v = v1+v2 (mod n).
In each MTS, u1 and v1 are chosen uniformly at random from Zn; u2 and v2 are
correspondingly deﬁned, as above, so that u = u1+u2 (mod n) and likewise for v.
Clearly, if given encryptions as in MTS and
w1;1+w1;2+w2;1+w2;2 = w (mod n) (1)
then in fact uv = w (mod n). But for P to prove and for V to verify all the re-
lationships included in the MTS, P must reveal u1, u2, v1, and v2, which would
consequently reveal u and v. Thus we adopt for an interactive proof the following
challenge and partial revelation proof. P constructs and sends MTS. V randomly
chooses a challenge pair (i; j), say, (1;2), and sends it to P. In this case, P reveals
r1, s2, and p1;2. This allows V to decrypt E(u1), E(v2), and E(w1;2), and directly
verify that u1v2  w1;2 (mod n). P further reveals:
R = r1r2r 1 (mod n)
S = s1s2s 1 (mod n)
p = p1;1 p1;2 p2;1 p2;2t 1 (mod n)
V by use of R veriﬁes E(u1)E(u2)E(u) 1 (mod n2) = E(0;R), i.e., veriﬁes u =
u1+u2 (mod n) and similarly v=v1+v2 (mod n) via S. Finally, V veriﬁes E(w1;1)
E(w1;2)E(w2;1)E(w2;2)t 1 (mod n2)=E(0;p),therebyverifyingthat(1)holds.
20A moment’s thought reveals that if MTS was not proper then the probability of V
uncovering this by the random choice of (i; j) is at least 1
4. Thus the probability of
P meeting the challenge when uv 6= w (mod n) is at most 3
4. This implies that if
m MTS’s are used and P meets all m random challenges then the probability of P
cheating is smaller than (3
4)m. In practice, the auctioneer will act as P and verify
the multiplications required to prove the validity of multi-item auction allocations
by repeating these zero-knowledge proofs until the desired probability of error is
achieved.
2.5.3 Veriﬁable, Secrecy Preserving Range-of-Values Tests
In order to prove for two values a and b that a  b, we can show that a;b < n=2
and then that (a b) (mod n) < n=2 as described above. 15 This works because if
a and b are less than n=2 and a is greater than b, then clearly a b < n=2; if a is
less than b, then a b will “wrap around” modulo n and must be a large number,
that is, a < b ) a b (mod n) > n=2.
There are many approaches to prove in zero knowledge whether an encrypted value
lies in a given range. We have formally speciﬁed and implemented a method that
is easy to understand based on bit representations of encrypted values (below and
Appendix 2.5.1); Damg˚ ard et al. [22] and Lipmaa et al. [43] present other simi-
lar solutions for Paillier encryption and auctions, respectively. Even more efﬁcient
techniques, based on clever number theoretic results (see [13,19,9,32,61]), may of-
fer efﬁciency gains in future implementations of our protocol.
Thus, with a single additional primitive to prove that x <n=2 given only an encryp-
tion of x, we can prove inequalities of bids using only their encrypted forms. Given
ciphertext C = E(x;r) we want to prove that x < 2t for some t such that 2t < n=2.
That is, we we want to be able to verify that a bid Bidi is smaller than some agreed
upon bound 2t, without revealing any information about Bidi. The value of t deter-
mines the number of bits of resolution available to bidders in selecting their bids.
For our purposes it sufﬁces to taket =34, so that if bids are in units of one thousand
dollars, for example, then bids are limited to at most $16 trillion.
We perform the test as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 A valid test set TS for the assertion “C = E(x;r) is an encryption of
a number x < 2t < n=2” is a set of 2t encryptions:
TS = fG1 = E(u1;s1);:::;G2t = E(u2t;s2t)g (2)
15 Because our mathematical operations are over the integers modulo a large number, a
small negative number is the same as a large positive number, and vice versa. For example,
13   2 (mod 15).
21where each of the powers of 2: 1;2;:::;2t 1 appears among the ui exactly once and
the remaining t values uj are all 0. Each test set’s elements are randomly ordered.
By use of a test set TS, the prover P can prove that x < 2t < n=2 as follows:
Range Protocol. Let x = 2t1 +:::+2t` be the representation of x, a sum of distinct
powers of 2. AU selects from TS the encryptions Gj1;:::;Gj` of 2t1;:::;2t`, and
further t  ` encryptions Gj`+1;:::;Gjt of 0. Note that:
 
E(x;r) 1Gj1 :::Gjt

(mod n2) = E(0;s) (3)
is an encryption of 0 with help value s =
 
r 1sj1 :::sjt

(mod n) if and only if
indeed x = 2t1 +:::+2t` and the Gjh were chosen as stated. Now since P has the
decryption key f and thus knows the help value r, then he can hand over to V the
set fGj1;:::;Gjtg and the above help value s. V can now verify on her own that (3)
holds and deduce that x < 2t < n=2. 2
The above protocol reveals nothing to V beyond x < 2t < n=2, because TS is a set,
in actual implementation a randomly permuted array of the elements in question.
Consequently V has no information about which encryptions of powers of 2 are
included in fGj1;:::;Gjtg Furthermore, the inclusions of t  ` encryptions of 0
hides even the number of non-zero bits in the binary representation of x. Finally,
the random factors sj1;:::;sjt present in the test set’s encryptions combine to a
uniformly random s, which completely masks any information about the help value
r in the encryption E(x;r). Consequently no information about x is revealed.
There is, however, a problem with the above protocol in that V does not know that
P has presented her with a true test set. This is overcome as follows. For ease of
understanding we ﬁrst describe an interactive veriﬁcation protocol, then modify it
for non-interactive use. The idea is to use a “cut and choose” procedure in which the
prover commits to a number of test sets and allows the veriﬁer to choose and inspect
multiple test sets and make sure that they are each valid. Finally, the remaining test
sets are all used to complete the proof. An early, possibly the ﬁrst, use of this idea
was presented by Rabin [59].
Tamper Proof Interactive Veriﬁcation of x<2t <n=2. First, the prover P creates
2v, say for v=20, test sets TS1;:::;TS2v, and presents those to V claiming that they
are all valid. Veriﬁer V randomly selects v test sets TSi1;:::;TSiv and requests that P
reveal all the encryptions by revealing all the corresponding help values. V veriﬁes
all the encryptions and checks that every TSih is valid. If any veriﬁcation fails, the
process is aborted. Otherwise, there now remain v unexamined test sets, call them
TSj1;:::;TSjv. P now completes v repetitions of the above Range Protocol, and
establishes that x < 2t < n=2 by use of each of the above remaining v test sets. If
all veriﬁcations succeed then V accepts that indeed x < 2t < n=2.
22The only way that P can cheat is if all the above remaining v test sets are invalid,
which requires that initially the 2v test sets comprised v proper test sets and v im-
proper ones and, furthermore, when examining the test sets, V randomly chose all
the v proper ones. The probability of such an unfortuitous choice is
 2v
v
 1
. In our
example of v = 20, that probability is, by Sterling’s Theorem, about
q
20p
240 < 8
1012.
Thus, we have a zero-knowledge protocol for V to verify interactively with AU
that x < 2t < n=2, when given a ciphertext E(x;r) such that the inequality actually
holds.
Tamper Proof Non-Interactive Veriﬁcation of x < 2t < n=2. We prefer to adopt
the following non-interactive method to establish the validity of test sets in our
scheme. In what follows, we adopt the auctioneer AU as the prover. Suppose that
there are (as in Section 3.2) 2k range-of-values tests to perform. On closing the
auction but before receiving information about bids, AU posts 4kv test sets on the
bulletinboard.(Forexpositoryconvenience,weproceedbelowwithourassumption
of v = 20.)
Priortoclosing,eachbidder,theseller(ifdesired),andtheauctioneerarealsoasked
to commit to a random string, which will be revealed after the auction closes and
after the auctioneer commits to test sets. Given strings Si from each bidder, SS from
the seller, and SAU from the auctioneer, the strings are XORed together to generate
X = S1 S2 Sk SS SAU. Note that even if only one of the participants
chooses his string randomly and independently, then X is a truly random string.
The 80k test sets posted on the Bulletin Board are then segmented into 2k groups of
40 test sets each, i.e., the ﬁrst 40 test sets, the next 40 test sets, etc. The random bit-
string X is then used, in combination with a ﬁxed rule available to all participants
and posted at the start of the auction to the bulletin board, to select 20 test sets from
each group. This random selection replaces the random selection by the veriﬁer V
employed in the interactive proof and allows the proof to work without interaction.
2.5.4 Bulk Veriﬁcation of Test Sets
Because in practice an auction will require large numbers of test sets, we may
accelerate the non-interactive veriﬁcation process by verifying all the test sets to be
used for an auction en masse, which requires a smaller percentage of the test sets
be revealed and thereby made unusable.
We have already shown how AU can use a test set to prove both that for any en-
crypted bids E(Bid1) and E(Bid2), fBid1;Bid2g  2t and Bid1 > Bid2, provided
2t < n=2. However, the veriﬁer V needs to know that the test set AU uses to prove
this is correctly constructed in order to believe the proof.
23In a traditional zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) setting, AU would present V with
several test sets in a “cut-and-choose” protocol, and V would then select at V’s own
discretion some of the testsets for AU to reveal. In our setting, it is impractical for
AU to perform real-time ZKP’s of bid correctness to all of the veriﬁers. Therefore,
we employ a technique where instead of the veriﬁer choosing the test sets to reveal,
we derive randomness from the test sets themselves and use that randomness to
deﬁne both which test sets will be revealed, and the order in which other test sets
willbeusedtoverifybids.ThismeansthatAUcanpublishaZKPofthecorrectness
ofthetestsetsthatanyonecanverify.Thiscanevenbedoneasynchronously,i.e.the
test sets used to prove an auction correct can be veriﬁed correct before an auction
closes.
Insingle-itemauctionswithBbidders,AUwillverifyBbidsandB 1comparisons
to prove the correctness of the auction. These auctions require 2B 1 proofs.
Weobservethatallofthetestsetswillbeofidenticalformforsuchanauction.Each
test set will contain t encryptions of powers of 2: 20;:::;2t 1, and t encryptions of
0. For visual comfort, we will use examples where t = 32, accommodating bids
in a range of over 4 billion values. Because any bid or comparison of bids can be
veriﬁed using such a test set, we will prepare a single very large collection of test
sets that will be used for all comparisons in an auction.
We demonstrate with very high probability that for collections of sufﬁcient size, af-
ter revealing 20% of the collection, no more than 10% of the remaining unrevealed
test sets are improper. Assuming we draw from the remaining test sets uniformly
at random, the probability of a correctness proof of s succeeding, i.e., all s sets are
improper is < 10 s.
If we select and reveal 500 test sets uniformly at random in a collection of 2500, the
probability that all 500 will be correct and 200 (or more) of the remaining 2000 are
incorrect is < 710 19. We can then prove correctness of each bid or comparison
with probability of error < 10 10 by drawing 10 of the remaining 2000 test sets
uniformly at random and proving correctness on each of them. These numbers are
appropriate for an auction with 100 bidders and moderate security requirements.
We can achieve a reasonable “random” ordering from the test sets using the random
data string X constructed from the XOR of the values S1;:::;Sk from the bidders,
SAU from the auctioneer, and optionally SS from the seller. We will call R some
predeﬁned substring of X of suitable length for this purpose.
Step 1. AU privately creates 2500 test sets TSi;i 2 [0;2499], each of which
is comprised of encryptions of 64 small values, fci0;:::;ci63g = fE(0) 
32;E(20);:::;E(231)g. AU creates a secret random permutation pi(0:::63) 2
f0:::63g for each TSi for each of the encrypted values in the test set and privately
stores the plaintexts,random help values r and exponentiations thereof rn (mod n2).
24Step 2. AU creates a permutation r(0:::2499) 2 f0:::2499g of an ordering of the
2500 test sets using the random data in R according to the protocol published at the
beginning of the auction.
Step 4. AU reveals the ﬁrst 500 test sets deﬁned by the ordering r. Veriﬁers will
be given a reasonable speciﬁed time (depending on the size and complexity of the
auction) to verify the correctness of these test sets, after which the test sets will
be deemed correct if no objections are raised with AU or the notaries. If a test set
is discovered to be invalid, the AU creates 2500 new test sets and the protocol is
begun anew at Step 1.
Step 5. If all 500 test sets are correct, then r (excluding the revealed test sets)
deﬁnes the random ordering of the unrevealed test sets that are used to prove each
bid.
Once the bids have been published on the bulletin board by the auctioneer in a strict
ordering where AU claims, without loss of generality, for all i < j;Bidi  Bidj,
then each bid Bidi;1  i  B is veriﬁed for correctness by the next 10 unused test
sets in the collection in the order deﬁned by r. Following that, the comparisons
Bidi  Bidi+1 are proven, again by using each successive set of 10 unused test sets
from the ordering deﬁned by r.
3 Single-Item Auctions
Given the above cryptographic tools we can formulate a single-item auction suc-
cinctly. We assume that the bidders B1;:::;Bk are known entities with publicly
known digital signatures Signi. We further assume that the winner and her payment
depend only on the ordering of the values of the bids and that the payment is one
of the bids.
This class of auctions includes ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions, and also al-
lows for auctions with reservation prices by a simple extension in which the seller
also submits a bid. 16 Thus, this class also includes revenue-maximizing auctions,
as described in Myerson [50], in symmetric environments in which all bidders are
assumed to have independent private values drawn at uniform from the same dis-
tribution.
16 In a Vickrey auction with a reservation price, in addition to bids Bid1;:::;Bidk there
is a price rp from the seller which is handled just as any other bid. The item is sold to
the highest bidder if the maximal bid is at least rp but goes unsold otherwise. (Think of
this as “selling back to the seller”.) When sold, the payment is the maximal value of the
second highest bid and the reservation price. Note that because the seller must commit to
his reservation price just like any other bidder there is no danger of shill bidding.
25For clarity, we focus here on an auction in which the complete outcome of the
auction—the winner and the payment by the winner—is made public and then
proved to be correct. The same techniques can be used to selectively prove part
of the outcome to some party, for instance to prove the winner but not the winner’s
payment is correct.
3.1 Protocol
Step 1. AU posts the following information on the bulletin board: the terms of the
auction specifying the item, the mechanism for selection of the winner, the deadline
T, an identiﬁer ID of the auction, and a Paillier encryption key n. AU knows the
corresponding decryption key f. The auctioneer also posts information about any
notaries that are to be used for the auction. He posts the time-lapse encryption key
TPK to be used by all participants in constructing their commitments. Finally, the
auctioneer posts a commitment to his random string ComAU(SAU) and a speci-
ﬁcation of the method that will be used to extract random permutations from the
auction’s random data string X. 17
We emphasize that all of the above data DAU is posted on the bulletin board, ac-
companied by AU’s signature SignAU(DAU).
Step 2. Every Bi chooses a bid Bidi. She encrypts it as Ci = E(Bidi;ri) using the
public key n and a randomly chosen help value ri. In order to create efﬁcient test
sets to prove bid sizes, we restrict the size of the bid so that Bidi < 2t < n=2 for
small t, say, t = 34. Every Bi also generates a random bit string Si of appropriate
length which will be used in the proof of correctness. Bidder Bi then commits to
Ci and Si by encrypting with ETPK to form a single commitment string Comi =
ETPK([Ci;Si;ID]), which also includes the auction identiﬁer ID. Finally, the bidder
signs this commitment, and sends Signi(Comi) to AU and her notaries, if used,
before time T. AU returns a signed receipt Ri = SignAU([Comi;ID;T]).
Note that hiding of the encrypted bids and of the random strings by use of the sec-
ondary encryption prevents anyone from gaining any knowledge of the data prior
to time T. In particular, neither the notaries nor the auctioneer have any meaningful
information.
Step 3. At time T, the AU posts all the received commitments Com1;:::;Comk on
the bulletin board, as well as a random bit string SAU. AU also creates a number of
17 We recall from Section 2.4.3 the random strings Si XORed together to yield the auction
random data X. AU must specify here the method used to extract a permutation of test sets
from X before AU sees X so that everyone knows AU is revealing a truly random selection
of test sets.
26test sets TS1;TS2;:::;TSK, where K is a multiple of k, e.g., K = 80k. He signs and
posts the test sets on the bulletin board.
Step 4. Between time T and T +1 any Bidder Bi who has a receipt Ri for a bid
which is not posted, can appeal her non-inclusion, resorting to her notaries if she
has used them.
Step 5. After time T +1, everyone, including the auctioneer AU and all bidders Bi,
can recover all encrypted bidsCi =E(Bidi;ri) as well as all random strings Si. This
is done by employing the decryption key TSK posted by the TLC service to decrypt
all the commitments posted in Step 2. After time T +1, AU posts the encrypted
bids,C1;:::;Ck, and the random strings, S1;:::;Sk;SAU, on the bulletin board. Ev-
ery bidder Bi can verify, for any bidder Bj, that the posted value Comj corresponds
to the ciphertext Cj and the random data string Sj. In case of discrepancies she
protests. This check can be performed simply by decoding the commitments as
above and verifying the digital signatures on these commitments. Every interested
party constructs the auction’s random data string X by combining the published
strings: X = S1:::SkSAU.
Step 6. Using the decryption key f, AU recovers the bids Bid1;:::;Bidk for com-
puting the auction results and associated random help values r1;:::;rk for con-
structing the proofs of correctness. 18 The auctioneer then computes the winner of
the auction and the payment according to the auction rules. The auctioneer posts
the winner’s identity Bi and information deﬁning the payment to be made by the
winner on the bulletin board. This information about payment can be posted in an
encrypted form if the payment is to be kept secret from nonwinning bidders. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the auctioneer also posts information that will enable
any party to verify that the correct result was implemented. These include proofs of
the correctness of the winner and payment, and proofs of the validity of each bid.
3.2 Veriﬁcation
We now show how any veriﬁer V (including any of the bidders) can verify on her
own that the winner and payment of the auction were determined according to
the rules of the auction. This will be done in a “zero knowledge” fashion, that
is, without revealing anything about the value of any bid except that implied by
the outcome of the auction. In addition, the auctioneer can choose how much of the
outcome is revealed. For example, the proof can validate that an encrypted payment
was correctly determined but without revealing any information about the value of
the payment.
18 See Appendix A.3.1 for details of the decryption.
27The class of single-item auctions under consideration (including ﬁrst-price and
second-price auctions) has the property that the winner and payment depend only
on the ordering of the bids. Take as an example the Vickrey auction and assume,
without loss of generality, that the prices posted by bidders B1;:::;Bk are mono-
tonically decreasing (though there may be tied bids). AU announces that B1 is the
winning bidder, which is tantamount to the following set of claims:
fBid1 > Bid2; Bid2  Bid3; :::;Bid2  Bidkg (4)
Note that the encrypted values
fC1;:::;Ckg = fE(Bid1;r1);:::;E(Bidk;rk)g; (5)
were posted in Step 5 of the protocol. To prove the claims, it sufﬁces to show that
each Ci is an encryption of a valid bid 0  Bidi < 2t < n=2 for all i, and that
fC1C2;C2C3;:::;C2Ckg (6)
Veriﬁer V veriﬁes these 2k 1 claims in a zero knowledge fashion using the tools
described above, which enables veriﬁcation of the winner, item allocation, and pay-
ment as described in the following paragraphs.
Recall that the auctioneer had posted 2k groups of 40 test sets in Step 3. He creates
proofs for each of the ﬁrst k claims using k of these groups of 40 test sets, one for
each claim. He reveals all encryptions for the subgroup of 20 test sets determined
by the random string X and the random method posted in Step 1 of the auction.
With each of the 20 other test sets AU performs the computation described in Sec-
tion 15 (Range Protocol) and posts it on the bulletin board. V can verify that all the
revealed test sets are valid, that their indices were chosen correctly, and that the k
posted computations are of the form (3). This veriﬁes the ﬁrst k claims. In addition,
AU posts proofs for the k 1 claims that Bid1 >Bid2 and Bid2 Bidi;2<ik by
using k 1 groups of 40 additional test sets for each inequality using the methods
described in Section 2.5.1.
This ordering of bids is used to verify the winner as the bidder with identity cor-
responding to submitted bid E(Bid1), and the item is allocated to this bidder. In
a Vickrey auction, the payment to be made by the winner is Bid2 and this can be
proved by sending a veriﬁer V the random help value r2 from B2’s encrypted bid
C2 = E(Bid2;r2). V can then verify the correctness of its payment by re-encrypting
Bid2 with r2 and checking the result isC2.
In the case of a tie, where Bid1 = Bid2, this can also be proven using a zero-
knowledge equality proof. (Indeed, the auctioneer would not be able to prove
E(Bid1)E(Bid2).) Tiebreaking in the single item case is done according to the
auction rules, either by conducting another auction or randomly selecting a winner
28using the auction random data string X according to rules deﬁned at the beginning
of the auction.
3.3 Verifying Partial Information about Outcomes
As mentioned in the introduction, there exist many examples in which the public
disclosure of the bids or outcome of an auction is undesirable. Because there are
a number of factors that play a role in determining which data are to be revealed
at the close of the auction, our system provides the ﬂexibility for the auctioneer to
prove speciﬁc facts about the bids or outcome of the auction to only the individuals
who need to know, without revealing anything more.
Many real-world auctions reveal such partial information, perhaps most notably the
U.S. Treasury auctions for U.S. public debt, where only partial information about
the bids is revealed. In that case the reputation of the Treasury provides the trust
necessary for them not to disclose complete auction information, but where such
a reputable auctioneer or seller is not involved, our correctness proofs provide the
trust necessary to conduct such an opaque auction.
The ﬂexibility of our system comes from the architecture of our correctness proofs;
a veriﬁer computes mathematical operations on public values posted to the bulletin
board (the bidders’ encrypted bids, random strings, and auction rules); the auction-
eer then reveals a small amount of special data to the veriﬁer that they compare
to their calculations to verify the proof. This allows the auctioneer to control ex-
actly who gets a correctness proof of any fact by private revelation of that special
data. We illustrate below the power of our approach by examples of various partial
information the auctioneer might reveal about bids and payments.
Bids. At one extreme, the auctioneer can reveal all bids to the public by revealing
the random help values used to encrypt the bids. At the other, the auctioneer need
not reveal any bid to any bidder to prove the payments correct. Yet there may be
legal or auction theoretic reasons to provide “partial transparency” of bids. Due to
the nature of the homomorphic cryptosystem employed, the auctioneer can reveal
interesting partial information about the bids that can be computed using linear
functions of the bid values. For example, the auctioneer might wish to reveal only
the mean bid—equivalent to the sum of all bids, assuming the number of bids is
public. He does this by revealing the random help value required to decrypt the
product of all encrypted bids (which is an encryption of the sum of all bids). The
auctioneer could also reveal other interesting statistics, such as the maximum and
minimumbid,themedianbid,themeanofthebidsexcludingthehighestandlowest
bid, or even the standard deviation of bids.
Payments. The auctioneer may also prove winners’ payments correct in a public
or private fashion. For example, instead of revealing winners’ payments to every-
29one, each bidder can act as her own veriﬁer. She computes an encryption of her
payment on her own, and then decrypts it with the auctioneer’s help. The auction-
eer can privately reveal just the payments—without the bids—to both the sellers
and the winners, and prove to all bidders who did not win that their bid was not
high enough to win. Thus the seller and every bidder are satisﬁed that the auction
was conducted fairly, yet no information about the outcome of the auction needs
to be publicized. Further transparency can be provided by requesting bidders “sign
off” on their proven outcomes with a digital signature, so that the auctioneer can
show that every bidder accepted the outcome. If a bidder refuses, the auctioneer
can prove the outcome he provided was indeed correct by publicly revealing it.
4 Multi-Item Auctions
Considernowauctionsformultipleidenticalitems.Intheseauctions,theauctioneer
has some number l of available identical items for sale. Real-life examples include
large lots of refurbished items on eBay, or U.S. Treasury bills. We consider auctions
in which bids are ﬂexible and each bidder is willing to accept any number of items
up to a maximal limit and bid a price per item. However, there is nothing about the
framework that is limited in this way, and we will describe extensions to “all-or-
nothing” bids and “bid curves” [70,35] in future work.
As before, we can implement a general class of auctions that includes the ﬁrst-
price, uniform-price, and second-price (generalized Vickrey) auctions [36]. These
are auctions in which the allocation depends only on the order of the bids and pay-
ments are deﬁned as linear functions of the values of bids. For illustrative purposes
we again focus on the case in which the complete outcome of the auction, i.e. the
allocation and all payments, is made public and then proved to be correct. Easy
variants are available in which the correctness is selectively proved, either pub-
licly for some restricted information about the outcome or privately to individual
bidders.
4.1 Protocol
Step 1. AU posts the auction information on the bulletin board as in Section 3.1.
In addition, AU posts the total number of items available, l, and the maximum
allocation to any one bidder (if any), lmax.
Step 2. Each participating bidder Bi prepares two integer values (Bidi;Qtyi) for
each bid she wishes to submit to the auction, where Bidi is the amount that she will
pay per item and Qtyi is the maximum number of items desired by Bi.
30As above, Bi also generates a random bit string Si and sends it to AU. Bi then
encrypts Bidi and Qtyi, using AU’s public Paillier key n, as E(Bidi) and E(Qtyi)
and commits by sending AU and her notaries, if used, the commitment
Comi = [ETPK(E(Bidi));ETPK(E(Qtyi));ETPK(Si);ID]; (7)
and digital signature Signi(Comi). AU issues a receipt for these commitments and
publishes them on the bulletin board in accordance with our standard protocol.
Step 3. As above, at time T, the auctioneer AU posts received commitments, his
random string SAU, and test sets on the bulletin board. The number of test sets will
depend on the type of the auction and the payment calculation; these numbers are
detailed in Section 5.
Step 4. As above, bidders have between time T and T +1 to appeal non-inclusion,
which may involve resorting to the commitments sent to any notaries.
Step 5. As above, bidders’ encrypted bids and quantities E(Bidi) and E(Qtyi),
as well as their strings Si, are revealed between time T and T +1. AU publishes
these values on the bulletin board. All bidders can check that the revealed values
correspond with earlier commitments.
Step 6. AU privately recovers bids Bid1;:::;Bidk and quantities Qty1;:::;Qtyk us-
ing secret key f, and uses the information to compute the correct outcome of the
auction. We again assume, without loss of generality, that the prices bid by bidders
B1;:::;Bk are monotonically decreasing, though consecutive bids may be tied. We
then choose the threshold bid index, a, which is new in our multi-item setting, such
that bidders a;:::;Bk do not receive any items. The sum of the quantities associ-
ated with winning bids Bid1;:::;Bida 1 is greater than or equal to the number of
available items l, and this is not true for a smaller threshold index. Thus all bidders
Bi, such that i < a, are winners. The threshold winner a  1 may receive some
subset of her total demand. Formally, threshold index a is deﬁned so that:
"
a 2
å
i=1
Qtyi < l
#
^
"
a 1
å
i=1
Qtyi  l
#
(8)
Note that we have assumed here that there are enough bidders to cover all of the
supply. This can be handled without loss of generality, by also introducing a single
dummy bid at zero price for all supply, l. In addition to determining a, and thus the
winners in the auction, AU also posts proofs of which bidders won and their allo-
cations on the bulletin board, as well as proofs of the validity of each bidder’s bid
and quantity. He also computes proofs of correctness of each winner Bi’s payment.
If public veriﬁcation of payments is required, AU posts these correctness proofs on
the bulletin board, along with the random help values needed to decrypt the pay-
31ments. If the payments are to remain secret, he privately sends the proof for Bi’s
payment and any associated random help values to each winner Bi.
4.2 Veriﬁcation
The veriﬁcation step in a multi-item auction is more complex than for the single
item auction, but relies largely on the same cryptographic primitives used in the
simpler single-item case. Each veriﬁcation can be done in a zero knowledge fash-
ion, revealing no information beyond that implied by the outcome of the auction.
As before, AU ﬁrst publicly proves the minimum bid-ordering information, that all
winning bids are strictly greater than the threshold bid Bida, i.e., Bidi >Bida 1 for
all i < a  1 and Bida 1 > Bidj for all j  a. This reveals only minimum public
information about the value of the bids; the same information that is implied by the
outcome. AU will also prove that the bid values are valid and without wraparound.
(See Section 2.5.3 for an explanation of wraparound.)
In addition, AU must also prove that the quantities of the items were encrypted
correctly, i.e., without wraparound. We assume that l < 2t < n=2 for number of
available items l and test set size parameter t. AU ﬁrst proves that no bidder has
submitted a quantity greater than a speciﬁed maximum allowed allocation lmax  l.
To do this, AU ﬁrst encrypts E(l;1) and E(lmax;1); a help value 1 is used so that
anyone can verify those encryptions. AU then proves E(Qtyi)E(lmax;1) for all
1  i  k. Next, AU can use encryptions of various sums of quantities to prove the
correctness of the threshold bid index a. Paillier’s homomorphic encryption system
allows for a zero-knowledge proof that a ciphertext represents the encrypted value
of the sum of two encrypted values; in particular, Õ
a 2
i=1 E(Qtyi) = E(å
a 2
i=1 Qtyi).
Given this, AU can establish Eq. 8 over the encrypted quantities:
"
E(
a 2
å
i=1
Qtyi)E(l)
#
^
"
E(
a 1
å
i=1
Qtyi)E(l)
#
(9)
4.2.1 Tiebreaking
In the event of a tie, with multiple bids equal in value to Bida 1, the auction-
eer must also prove equality of these bid values and then establish correctness in
allocating to these tied threshold bidders. Various algorithms exist for allocating
the items among winners with equal bids at the threshold. One possibility is to
randomly order the threshold bidders and divide the items among them in “round
robin” fashion until the items are exhausted, with the condition that no bidder Bi is
entitled to more than the Qtyi items bid for.
32In this case, we require additional proofs that the allocation is fair. In summary, we
use the random data X jointly constructed by all auction participants to deﬁne a
publicly veriﬁable ordering p of w equal bidders, 19 p(1:::w) 2 f1:::kg such that
Bp(1) is the ﬁrst to be allocated an item, and so forth, and prove the round robin
allocation as follows. We notate li as the allocation to bidder Bi.
Step 1. Prove that the allocations to all bidders add to l, i.e. å
k
i=1li = l.
Step 2. Given ordering p of threshold bidders, compute j such that Bp(j) is the ﬁrst
bidder in the ordering to receive a partial allocation. Compute h such that Bp(h) is
the ﬁrst bidder in the ordering to receive lp(j) 1 items, i.e. the next bidder in line
when the items ran out. If no such h exists, set h = w+1.
Step 3. Prove that all allocations were fair as follows:
3a. For 1  i < j, prove lp(i) = Qtyp(i) and lp(i) < lp(j).
3b. For j < i < h, prove either that lp(i) = lp(j), or both lp(i) = Qtyp(i) and lp(i) <
lp(j).
3c. For h  i  w, prove that lp(i) = (lp(j) 1), or both lp(i) = Qtyp(i) and lp(i) <
lp(j).
In words, we show that bidders either received their entire allocation or at most
one fewer than the ﬁrst bidder in line to receive a partial allocation, and that the
ordering of the partial allocations is proper.
4.2.2 Payment
In a ﬁrst-price auction, the auctioneer can prove a payment to a third party by
revealing the random help value used to encrypt winner B1’s bid. A veriﬁer can
use this to recover Bid1 from the now public encrypted value E(Bid1) submitted
by the bidder. Similarly, in a uniform-price auction, whereby every bidder pays the
bid price of the losing threshold bidder Ba 1, AU can provide a public proof by
revealing Bida 1 via the help value used by Ba 1. The uniform price auction is an
approximation to a Vickrey auction in this setting. It generates the same payment
as in the Vickrey auction to winning bidders i < a  1, as long as the threshold
bidder has enough spare demand to cover the allocated capacity of any winner. The
payment by the threshold winner Ba 1 is always larger than in the Vickrey scheme.
We turn our attention to proving the correctness of prices in a generalized Vickrey
auction (GVA) for this multi-item setting [36]. As in the single item setting, the
GVA provides the useful property of truthfulness so that each bidder’s dominant
strategy is to bid her true value per unit and true quantity demanded. In a GVA
mechanism the number of items are allocated according to the price bid but the
actual payment for each winner depends on others’ bids. The Vickrey payment for
19 Generating such a random ordering is described in Section 2.4.3.
33bidder Bi is deﬁned as:
pvcg;i = Qty
i Bidi [V(B) V(B i)]; (10)
where V(B) is the total revenue in the auction with all bidders, V(B i) is the total
revenue in the marginal economy with bidder Bi removed, and Qty
i denotes the
quantity allocated to bidder i in the auction. This has a simple interpretation: a
bidder’s payment is determined as the greatest amount other (displaced) bidders
would have paid for the same items had Bi not been participating in the auction.
We require a proof to establish the correctness of this payment. Let Qty i
j denote
the quantity awarded to bidder Bj in the marginal auction without bidder Bi. For a
non-marginal winner, i.e., i < a  1, her GVA payment is:
Qty
i Bidi 
"
Qty
i Bidi+ å
j6=i;ja 1
Qty
j Bidj
#
+ å
j6=i;jb i 1
Qty i
j Bidj
=
"
å
a 1<jb i 1
Qty i
j Bidj
#
+[Qty i
a 1Bida 1 Qty
a 1Bida 1] (11)
For the marginal winner, i = a  1, her GVA payment is:
Qty
i Bidi [Qty
i Bidi+ å
j6=i;j<a 1
Qty
j Bidj] + å
j6=i;jb i 1
Qty i
j Bidj
= å
a 1<jb i 1
Qty i
j Bidj (12)
Thus, the GVA payment by bidder Bi is a linear combination of the product of the
bid price and allocated quantity to bidders displaced by bidder Bi from the winning
allocation. In the case of a non-marginal bidder, this computation also accounts for
the effect on the allocation to bidder a  1.
Consider the following veriﬁable proof structure for the term åa 1<jb i 1Qty i
j 
Bidj that is common to both kinds of winners:
Step 1. In generating the proof, AU must ﬁrst establish a bid ordering for the
marginal auction without Bi, i.e., prove that b i is the correct threshold bid index
by showing Bidj >Bidb i 1 for j 6=i; j <b i 1 and Bidb i 1 >Bidj for j b i;
this can be done as in the main auction. Second, AU must prove that bidder b i 1
is the threshold winner in this auction, by proving the analog to Eq. 8. Third, AU
must publish encrypted values Payj = Qtyj Bidj for all j > ai; j < b i 1 (and
similarly for the new marginal bidder, Payb i 1 = Qty i
b i 1Bidb i 1), and prove
the correctness of all of these ciphertexts. This requires proofs of correct multipli-
cation, as described in Appendix A. The proof of Payb i 1 in turn requires a proof
34of the quantity allocated Qty i
b i 1 to this bidder, via a proof that a published ci-
phertext is the encrypted value of l  åj6=i;j<b i 1Qtyj. Fourth, AU must publish
the encrypted value of the sum of these payments and a proof of its correctness.
Step 2. A veriﬁer V can independently compute the encrypted Vickrey payment as
above and check the correctness of the proof.
Step 3. AU reveals the random help value in the resulting encrypted Vickrey pay-
ment to V, who decrypts using that value and veriﬁes it is correct by re-encryption.
The veriﬁer V now knows that Bi’s Vickrey payment is correct while knowing (al-
most) nothing more about any bidder’s bid value than can be derived from the
deﬁnition of Vickrey payments. In fact, the veriﬁer V learns the number of bids
required to compute a Vickrey payment in the marginal economy E(B i). We can
get around this through padding the input using dummy bids as described in the
next section.
The additional term, [Qty i
a 1 Bida 1  Qty
a 1 Bida 1] can be determined in
the case that bidder i is the threshold winner and i = a   1 in an analogous
fashion. Encrypted values of the allocation quantities received by bidder i in the
main auction and in the marginal auction, i.e., Qty
a 1 and Qty i
a 1, can be es-
tablished via subtraction from total items l of the total allocation to other bid-
ders. Then, a ciphertext for the difference, Qty i
a 1 Qty
a 1, and then the product
(Qty i
a 1 Qty
a 1)Bida 1 can be published and proved.
4.2.3 Secrecy-Preserving Payment Proofs
While our above methods are correct, secure, and efﬁcient in practice, they reveal
a slight amount of additional information than that implied solely by the GVA pay-
ments. In particular, the method described to prove a GVA payment reveals the
number of bidders whose bids in the marginal economy determine a bidder’s price.
This section outlines a more involved solution that eliminates the revelation of that
information at some increased cost in complexity and computation.
We recall that the GVA payment for bidder Bi is deﬁned as:
pvcg;i = Qty
i Bidi [V(B) V(B i)]; (13)
where V(B) is the total revenue in the auction with all bidders, V(B i) as the total
revenue in the marginal economy with bidder Bi removed, and Qty
i denotes the
quantity allocated to bidder i in the auction.
In order to prove the correctness of term [V(B) V(B i)] we currently determine
the threshold bidder b i in the marginal economy (B i). Recall that the threshold
bidder b i is deﬁned so that all bids < b i 1 receive a full allocation, bid b i 1
35may receive a partial allocation, and bids b i receive no allocation. But establish-
ing the index of threshold bidder b i reveals information beyond that implied either
by knowledge of the outcome of the auction or by the amount of an agent’s GVA
payment, speciﬁcally information about the number of bidders that were displaced
by the presence of bid Bi.
To solve the problem we introduce a technique to prove the correctness of an encr-
pyted termV(B i) without revealing any information about the number of winners
in that marginal economy. This term can be used in combination with a proof of the
correctness of termV(B) and Qty
i Bidi to prove correctness for the GVA payment
to bidder i.
To illustrate the idea we consider the case of proving correctness of the encrypted
value of V(B) for the main economy without revealing the index of the threshold
bidder. Note also that a dummy bidder is included with bid 0 and quantity de-
manded l (the supply of items) when the total demand is less than l. Let k denote
the total number of bids in the input, including this dummy bidder when required.
In order to hide the true index of the threshold bidder the idea is to pad the input
with an additional k 1 bids such that threshold index a given the padded input is
always deﬁned so that a 1=k. Let g denote the threshold index given the original
input of k bids. The new bids are deﬁned as follows: there are k g+1 bids deﬁned
with Qtyj = 0 and Bidj =V for a maximal value V (higher than any posted bid),
and g  2 bids deﬁned with Qtyj = 0 and Bidj = 0.
For example, if k =5 then when g =2 (and only the ﬁrst bid receives an allocation)
then all k 1 new bids have Qtyj =0 and Bidj =V. On the other hand, when g =6
(and all bids receive some allocation) then all k 1 new bids have Qtyj = 0 and
Bidj = 0.
Lemma 1 The threshold index of the padded input is equal to k+1 and no infor-
mation is learned about the threshold index in the initial index.
Moreover, the introduction of this padded input does not change V(B) because the
new padded bids demand no quantity and thus contribute nothing to the revenue of
the auctioneer.
One problem remains with this solution: how do we ensure that the auctioneer can
be trusted to introduce dummy bids with this property without revealing to the
veriﬁer the mixture of high value and zero value bids introduced? The veriﬁer must
not be able to tell whether a bid in the padded input is a dummy bid or an original
bid, but still be conﬁdent that the auctioneer has provided a set of bids that contains
exactly the posted bids and quantities along with correct padding.
For this we can again use the idea of “cut and choose”:
36Step 1. The prover constructs 2v test sets TS1;:::;TS2v. Each test set contains
several bid collections. 20 TSi contains k collections of 2k 1 bids, one collection
for each of m 2 f0;:::;k 1g where there are m high value bids with quantity zero,
the k original bids and quantities, and k 1 m low value bids with quantity zero.
Each element of the collection is encrypted using the semantically secure Paillier
scheme used elsewhere. Instead of re-encrypting the original bids and quantities,
the auctioneer uses a blinding procedure (see Section 2.4.5) to yield an encryption
of the same value that cannot be identiﬁed as such. The 2k 1 elements of each
collection are permuted randomly; the k collections within each test set are also
permuted randomly. Now, each test set contains k collections of 2k 1 bids, where
each collection is the original auction’s bids padded with dummy bids and zero
quantities. These test sets are posted.
Step 2. The veriﬁer randomly selects v test sets, requests that the prover identify
each of the elements in every collection as either a high value, low value, or posted
bid, and prove that fact by revealing the random help values (for dummy bids and
their quantities) or the random blinding factor s and the original bid or quantity (for
blinded posted values). If there is a problem then the procedure is aborted and the
veriﬁer requests a new list of 2v fresh test sets.
Step 3. There remain v unexamined test sets. The prover will use each of these
to construct a proof as follows: for each test set, the prover identiﬁes one of the
collections of bids within that test set, and then completes the proof of the value for
V(B)usingthepaddedinputwiththatcollectionofbids.Notonlymustthepayment
be the same for each padded input but the threshold index, given the padded input,
must always be k+1. As before the value v may be selected to provide a desired
probability of error in the outcome.
Because we do not want to reveal which bid is in position a given marginal
economy (B i) and thus do not compute (and prove) the total revenue from bids
fa;:::;a i  1g we prove instead the total value of V(B i) in this new approach
rather than establishing directly the loss in revenue as a result of bid Bidi directly,
as in the previous section.
This approach can also be used to prove to each bidder the correctness of her allo-
cation without revealing the number of winners, and similarly to prove to any third
party the correctness of any single bidder’s allocation. As described in Section 3.3,
this may have special importance in auctions in which it is desirable for partial
information about the outcome to be privately proven to some parties; for exam-
ple, it may be desirable for the outcome to be secret while the seller, each bidder,
and perhaps a third-party auditor still receive a proof that the auction outcome is
correct.
20 For clarity, we use the two words “collection” and “set”, though there is no technical
meaning differentiating the two terms.
374.3 Extensions
We assume each bidder submits only one bid/quantity pair, but a single bidder
could simply submit multiple bids in order to represent a more complex utility
function. The auction will have the correct behavior when used with ﬁrst-price or
uniform-price payment schemes. For example, a bidder might wish to purchase
10 units if the price is $50, but 30 units if the price is $40. By placing two bids,
($50;10);($40;20), the bidder will receive, for example, 30 units if the thresh-
old for winning bids is less than $40, 10 units if the threshold is between $40
and $50. While this “additive-or” bidding logic does not permit bidders to specify
completely arbitrary utility functions, it does provide additional expressivity. Note,
though, that if this language is used in an auction with GVA payments the bid-
der’s payment could be too high. The logic of GVA requires removing both of its
($50,10) and ($40,20) bids when computing its payment, but this would not auto-
matically happen when considering these as separate bids. Extensions to correctly
handle GVA payments with more expressive languages [53], as well as methods to
adopt more expressive languages in which bidders can submit a set of bids with
explicit logical dependencies, are reserved for future work.
5 Empirical Results
We implemented Paillier encryption and test set veriﬁcation in C++ using the
LiDIA number theory package [42] on a commodity Linux workstation with a Pen-
tium 4 2.8 GHz processor.
The greatest computational cost in our protocol is the construction and veriﬁcation
of test sets, and in particular the exponentiation of random help values (rn) required
to encrypt or (veriﬁably) decrypt a value. These calculations dominate all other
computation; for example, to sort one million random 64-bit bids takes less than
one second on our system. In a single-item auction, the auctioneer can prepare for
an auction of 100 bidders in about two hours, and each veriﬁer can independently
verify the auctioneer’s proofs of correctness in less than half an hour. Both prepa-
ration and veriﬁcation scale linearly and are easily parallelized. Thus, with modest
distributed computation, even a multi-item auction with ten thousand bidders can
be prepared in a few hours and veriﬁed in reasonable time.
We present data for both 1024- and 2048-bit symmetric public encryption keys,
which are considered safe until 2010 and 2030, respectively [27]. Because the life-
time of a security key is based on the difﬁculty of breaking it on available com-
puting power, we claim that, for the most part, an auction with “5-year” security
at any point in time will take about the same amount of time as it does today, as
38improvements in computing power for breaking keys are likely to be comparable
to those in encryption. 21
Table 1 shows the time it takes to compute various cryptographic operations on our
test machine. We observe that the time required to prepare or verify a test set is
essentially that required by the encryption and decryption. All test sets represent
234 discrete values.
For a single item auction of k bidders, the auctioneer must produce k proofs of
valid bids (i.e. Bidi < 2t for small t; we use 34), and k 1 proofs of comparisons
to prove the ordering of the outcome. Using the bulk veriﬁcation method suggested
in Appendix 2.5.4, such an auction requires 10(2k 1) test sets, plus 25% for the
test sets that will be revealed to prove the test sets are valid. This gives us an upper
bound of 25k test sets required to conduct a trustworthy single-item auction.
For a multi-item auction with payments based on one bid (e.g. ﬁrst-price or second-
price), we need only add to the above k proofs Qtyi < 2t, k comparisons Qtyi <
lmax, and 2 comparisons to prove Equation 8. This means we need about double the
number of test sets, 4k+1, to conduct such a multi-item auction; about 50k test sets
are needed for trustworthiness. We list the time taken to prepare these test sets and
correctness proofs in Table 2.
For veriﬁed GVA payments in multi-item auctions (Section 4.2.2), we also require
proofs of multiplications for at most 2k+1 products, namely,  k proofs of the
products QtyiBidi and k+1 proofs of the products of the partial allocation to the
threshold bidder for the main economy E(B) and up to k marginal economies (that
is, excluding bidder Bi) E(B i). Each proof of a product requires 4 exponentiations
for creating the MTS (“multiplication test set”) and 6 exponentiations to verify it.
To achieve a reasonably small probability of error, we need to repeat the multiplica-
tion proof 80 times (3
4
80
10 10). Thus each proof requires 320 exponentiations to
create and 480 to verify. Table 3 shows time required, again on a P4 2.8 GHz pro-
cessor, to verify Vickrey payments in the worst case for various sizes of multi-item
auctions. These computations are required in addition to the above computations
for verifying prices and quantities.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a new protocol for sealed-bid auctions that guarantees trust and
preserves a high level of secrecy, yet is practical enough to run efﬁciently on com-
modity hardware and be accepted in the business community. Because we focus on
21 Of course, if efﬁcient algorithms to solve the composite residuosity problem or factor
large composites are discovered, our claim does not hold.
39proofs of correctness and secrecy during the auction, an auctioneer can still com-
pute optimal results efﬁciently and publish efﬁciently veriﬁable proofs of those
results. Our protocol rests on sound cryptographic foundations, and lends itself
to interesting extensions to further types of auctions, including support for all-
or-nothing bids, bid curves, and full combinatorial auctions; we intend to pursue
theseextensionsinlaterwork.Webelievethatourpractical,easilyimplementedap-
proach can be extended to other areas of privacy, including electronic transactions,
trading systems, privacy-preserving open outcry markets, and zero-knowledge pub-
lic veriﬁcation of private data. Along these lines, authors Thorpe and Parkes have
recently extended our methods to a continuous double auction setting for informa-
tion hiding in securities exchanges [76].
To further explore the practicality of our solution, David Austin has built a pro-
totype of our protocol. His Python implementation comprises a fully functional,
cross-platform web server and standalone client for creating, bidding on, and veri-
fying sealed-bid auctions. Because it is implemented in Python, it runs at approxi-
mately half the speed of our empirical tests, which were conducted using optimized
C++, but is still fast enough for practical use.
Other future work includes improving the efﬁciency of our protocols. Due to the
dominance of range proofs in auctions, employing more efﬁcient techniques to
prove an encrypted value in a particular range are likely to reduce the computa-
tion required to prove an auction correct (see Section 2.5.3, and [13,19,9,32,61]
cited there). Use of specialized cryptographic hardware for performing modular
exponentiation of very large integers instead of standard 32- and 64-bit hardware
may also yield signiﬁcant time savings. Finally, it may be that for many auctions,
the auction data need only be secure during the auction, and not for years later,
and thus shorter cryptographic keys might be employed at a signiﬁcant savings in
computational cost.
While we focus in this paper on auctions in which price is the only consideration,
non-price factors such as technical quality, terms of payment, and service agree-
ments, are of course also important in auctions used for procurement. However the
effect can be to make the rules of the auction “soft” and provide new opportunities
for corruption, since the auctioneer has new ﬂexibility to manipulate the outcome
of the auction in return for a bribe [66,14]. Of course, the use of cryptographic
methods to verify the correct outcome of an auction requires objective criteria for
determining the outcome based on the bids. It is useful, then, that concerns about
corruption have led the World Bank and other bodies to move towards requiring
quantiﬁable decision making, with the revelant “scoring” criteria published as part
of the rules of the auction [77,5,75]. This makes quality assessment objective and
reduces the corruption concerns to those of bid rigging in price-based sealed-bid
auctions. As such, it is of signiﬁcant interest in future work to develop provably
correct, and trustworthy auctions by appropriate extensions to our technology. We
40also plan to study the use of similar technology in cryptographic open-bid settings,
such as ascending price and combinatorial clock [57] auctions.
7 Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation award to Parkes
and NSF grant CCR-0205423 to Rabin. The authors thank Peter Coles, Michael
Hamburg, Alex Healy, Adam Juda, Andrew Pimlott, Pai-Ling Yin and the anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments and information. We also wish to thank Scott
Buffett and the ECRA editorial board for helpful guidance throughout the prepara-
tion and submission process.
41References
[1] M. Abe, K. Suzuki, M+1-st price auction using homomorphic encryption, in: Proc.
Public Key Cryptography, 2002.
[2] J. C. Andvig, Corruption in the North Sea oil industry: Issues and assessments, Crime,
Law & Social Change 23 (4) (1995) 289–313.
[3] L. Arozamena, F. Weinschelbaum, The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in
ﬁrst-price auctions, Tech. rep., Universidad de San Andres, 2004.
[4] O. Ashenfelter, How auctions work for wine and art, Journal of Economic Perspectives
3 (3) (1989) 23–36.
[5] J. Asker, E. Cantillon, Properties of scoring auctions, Tech. rep., Leonard N. Stern
School of Business, 2006.
[6] L. Baldwin, R. C. Marshall, J.-F. Richard, Bidder collusion at forest service timber
sales, The Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997) 657–699.
[7] O. Baudron, J. Stern, Non-interactive private auctions, in: Proc. Financial
Cryptography, 2001.
[8] T. B¨ orgers, E. van Damme, Auction theory for auction design, in: M. C. W.
Janssen,Ed.,AuctioningPublicAssets:AnalysisandAlternatives,chap.1,Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[9] F. Boudot, Efﬁcient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval, in: Proc.
Eurocrypt 2000, vol. LNCS 1807 (Springer, 2000) 431.
[10] P. G. Bradford, S. Park, M. H. Rothkopf, Protocol completion incentive problems
in cryptographic Vickrey auctions, Tech. Rep. RRR 3-2004, Rutgers Center for
Operations Research (RUTCOR), 2004.
[11] F. Brandt, How to obtain full privacy in auctions, Tech. rep., Carnegie Mellon
University, 2005.
[12] F. Brandt, T. Sandholm, (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving
auctions, in: Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems,
2004 810–817.
[13] E. Brickell, D. Chaum, I. Damg˚ ard, J. Van de Graaf, Gradual and veriﬁable release of
a secret, in: Proceedings of CRYPTO’87, vol. LNCS 293, 1988 156–166.
[14] R. Burgeut, Y.-K. Che, Competitive procurement with corruption, The RAND Journal
of Economics (1) (2004) 50–68.
[15] R. Burguet, M. Perry, Bribery and favoritism by auctioneers in sealed-bid auctions,
Tech. rep., Institute of Economic Analysis, UAB, Barcelona, 2003.
[16] M. Burmester, E. Magkos, V. Chrissikopoulos, Uncoercible e-bidding games,
Electronic Commerce Research 4 (1–2) (2004) 113–125.
42[17] C.Cachin,Efﬁcientprivatebiddingandauctionswithanobliviousthirdparty,in:Proc.
6th ACM Conf. on Computer and Comm. Security, 1999 120–127.
[18] M. Celantani, J. J. Ganuza, Corruption and competition in procurement, European
Economic Review 46 (7) (2002) 1273–1303.
[19] A. Chan, Y. Frankel, Y. Tsiounis, Easy come - easy go divisible cash, in: Proceedings
of EUROCRYPT’98, vol. LNCS 1403, 1998 561–575.
[20] X. Chen, K. Kim, B. Lee, Receipt-free electronic auction schemes using homomorphic
encryption, in: ICISC, 2003.
[21] O. Compte, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, T. Verdier, Corruption and competition in
procurement auctions, The RAND Journal of Economics 36 (1) (2005) 1–15.
[22] I. Damg˚ ard, M. Jurik, A generalisation, a simpliﬁcation and some applications of
Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system, in: Proc. Public Key Cryptography 01, 2001.
[23] N. Dimitri, G. Piga, G. Spagnolo, Eds., Handbook of Procurement – Theory and
Practice for Managers, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[24] T. ElGamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms, IEEE Trans. Information Theory IT-31 (4) (1985) 469–472.
[25] W. J. Elmaghraby, Pricing and auctions in emarketplaces, in: Handbook of
Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, 2004.
[26] M. K. Franklin, M. K. Reiter, The design and implementation of a secure auction
service, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 22 (5) (1996) 302–312.
[27] D. Giry, P. Bulens, Cryptographic key length recommendation, http://www.
keylength.com, accessed 04.13.2008.
[28] D. A. Graham, R. C. Marshall, Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second price
and english auctions, Journal of Political Economy 95 (6) (1987) 1217–1239.
[29] M. Harkavy, J. D. Tygar, H. Kikuchi, Electronic auctions with private bids, in: Proc.
Third USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1998 61–74.
[30] A. T. Ingraham, A test for collusion between a bidder and an auctioneer in sealed-bid
auctions, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 4 (1) (2005) 1–32.
[31] M. C. W. Janssen, Ed., Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[32] M. J. Jurik, Extensions to the paillier cryptosystem with applications to cryptological
protocols, Ph.D. thesis, University of ˚ Arhus, 2003.
[33] H. Kikuchi, (m+1)st price auction protocol, in: Proc. Financial Cryptography, 2001.
[34] S. A. Koc, W. S. Neilson, Bribing the auctioneer in ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions,
Tech. rep., Kocaeli University, 2006.
43[35] A. Kothari, D. C. Parkes, S. Suri, Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-
unit auctions, Decision Support Systems 39 (1) (2005) 105–121.
[36] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002.
[37] M. Kumar, S. I. Feldman, Internet auctions, in: Proc. 3rd USENIX Workshop on
Electronic Commerce, 1998.
[38] J.-J. Laffont, J. Tirole, Auction design and favoritism, International Journal of
Industrial Organization 9 (1) (1991) 9–42.
[39] S. Lahaie, An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search, in:
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006.
[40] Y. Lengwiler, E. Wolfstetter, Bid rigging. an analysis of corruption in auctions, Tech.
rep., Humboldt-University at Berlin, 2005.
[41] Y. Lengwiler, E. Wolfstetter, Corruption in procurement auctions, in: N. Dimitri,
G. Piga, G. Spagnolo, Eds., Handbook of Procurement – Theory and Practice for
Managers, chap. 16, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[42] LiDIA-Group, LiDIA — a library for computational number theory, TU Darmstadt
31 (3) (2001) 54–57.
[43] H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, V. Niemi, Secure Vickrey auctions without threshold trust,
in: Proc. 6th International Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC 2002), 2002
87–101.
[44] P. McAfee, J. McMillan, Auctions and bidding, Journal of Economic Literature 25 (2)
(1987) 699–738.
[45] J. McMillan, Selling spectrum rights, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (3) (1994)
145–162.
[46] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied
Cryptography, CRC Press, 2001.
URL http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/
[47] F. M. Menezes, P. K. Monteiro, Corruption and auctions, Tech. rep., Getulio Vargas
Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2001.
[48] P. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[49] B. Moldovanu, M. Tietzel, Goethe’s second-price auction, Journal of Political
Economy 106 (4) (1998) 854–859.
[50] R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1)
(1981) 58–73.
[51] T. Nakanishi, D. Yamamoto, Y. Sugiyama, Sealed-bid auctions with efﬁcient bids,
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/682949.html, accessed 04.13.2008.
[52] M. Naor, B. Pinkas, R. Sumner, Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design,
in: Proc. First ACM Conf. on Elec. Commerce, 1999 129–139.
44[53] N. Nisan, Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions, in: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham,
R. Steinberg, Eds., Combinatorial Auctions, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[54] P. Paillier, Cryptographie ` a cl´ e publique bas´ ee sur la r ´ esiduosit´ e de degr´ e composite,
Ph.D. thesis, ´ Ecole Nationale Sup´ erieure des T´ el ´ ecommunications, 1999.
[55] P. Paillier, Public-key cryptosystems based on composite residuosity classes, in: Proc.
EUROCRYPT ’99, 1999 223–239.
[56] M. Pesendorfer, A study of collusion in ﬁrst-price auctions, The Review of Economic
Studies 67 (3) (2000) 381–411.
[57] D. Porter, S. Rassenti, A. Roopnarine, V. Smith, Combinatorial auction design,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100 (19) (2003) 11153–11157.
[58] R. H. Porter, D. J. Zona, Detection of bid-rigging in procurement auctions, Journal of
Political Economy (3) (1993) 518–538.
[59] M. O. Rabin, Digitalized signatures, in: Foundations of Secure Computing, Academic
Press, New York, 1978, pp. 155–166.
[60] M. O. Rabin, Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as
factorization, Tech. Rep. MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science,
1979.
[61] M. O. Rabin, R. A. Servedio, C. Thorpe, Highly efﬁcient secrecy-preserving proofs of
correctness of computations and applications, in: Proc. IEEE Symposium on Logic in
Computer Science, 2007.
[62] M. O. Rabin, C. Thorpe, Time-lapse cryptography, Tech. Rep. TR-22-06, Harvard
University School of Engineering and Computer Science, 2006.
[63] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. M. Adleman, A method for obtaining digital signatures
and public-key cryptosystems, Tech. Rep. MIT/LCS/TM-82, MIT Laboratory for
Computer Science, 1977.
[64] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, D. A. Wagner, Time-lock puzzles and timed release crypto,
Tech. Rep. MIT/LCS/TR-684, MIT, 1996.
[65] M. S. Robinson, Collusion and the choice of auction, Rand J. Econ. 16 (1) (1985)
141–145.
[66] S. Rose-Ackerman, The economics of corruption, Journal of Public Economics 4 (2)
(1975) 187–203.
[67] M. H. Rothkopf, T. J. Teisberg, E. P. Kahn, Why are Vickrey auctions rare?, Journal
of Political Economy 98 (1) (1990) 94–109.
[68] T. C. Salmon, Preventing collusion between ﬁrms in auctions, in: M. C. W. Janssen,
Ed., Auctioning Public Assets: Analysis and Alternatives, chap. 3, Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[69] T. Sandholm, D. Levine, M. Concordia, P. Martyn, R. Hughes, J. Jacobes, D. Begg,
Changing the game in strategic sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive competition
enabled by optimization, Interfaces 36 (1) (2006) 55–68.
45[70] T. Sandholm, S. Suri, A. Gilpin, D. Levine, Winner determination in combinatorial
auction generalizations, in: Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2002.
[71] T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conﬂict, Harvard University Press, 1980.
[72] S. W. Smith, Trusted Computing Platforms: Design and Applications, Springer, New
York, 2005.
[73] S. G. Stubblebine, P. F. Syverson, Fair on-line auctions without special trusted parties,
in: Proc. of Financial Cryptography, 1999.
[74] K. Suzuki, M. Yokoo, Secure generalized Vickrey auction using homomorphic
encryption, in: Proc. Financial Cryptography, 2003.
[75] The World Bank, Guidelines Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits,
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank,
Washington, D.C., 2006.
[76] C. Thorpe, D. C. Parkes, Cryptographic securities exchanges, in: Proc. Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4886
(Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg, 2007) 163–178.
[77] P. Trepte, Regulating Procurement, Oxford University Press, 2004.
[78] U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook: European Union, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/print/ee.html, accessed 04.13.2008.
[79] W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of
Finance 16 (1) (1961) 8–37.
[80] M. Yokoo, K. Suzuki, Secure multi-agent dynamic programming based on
homomorphic encryption and its application to combinatorial auctions, in: Proc. First
Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2002.
A Paillier Encryption
A.1 Public/Secret Keys
Paillier encryption uses an encryption key n= pq, where p and q are large primes.
The decryption key is based on the factorization of n, f = j(n) = (p 1)(q 1).
We recall that j(n) is Euler’s totient function, the number of integers relatively
prime to n. It is also required that n is relatively prime to f.
46A.2 Encryption
To encrypt a plaintext x, ﬁrst compute a random value r from the range [1;n 1]
such that gcd(r;n)= 1, then recall that (1+n)x  (1+xn) (mod n2) and encrypt as
E(x;r) = (1+xn)rn (mod n2) (A.1)
A.3 Decryption
TodecryptC=E(x;r),givendecryptionkeyf =(p 1)(q 1),observethatrnf 
1 (mod n2) by Euler’s Totient Theorem, and
Cf = (1+n)xfrnf (mod n2)
=
 xf
0

n0+
 xf
1

n1+
 xf
2

n2+:::

(mod n2)
= 1+xfn+an2+::: (mod n2)
= 1+xfn (mod n2)
implying
x =
(Cf  1)=f mod n2
n
(A.2)
We did not use this method when obtaining our results in Section 5. Instead, we
used a more efﬁcient algorithm involving precomputation and Chinese remainder-
ing, as described in Paillier’s Ph.D. thesis [54].
A.3.1 Decryption with random help value r
It is also possible for some P who knows the r used to encryptC = E(x;r) to show
V that x is the unique decryption ofC by revealing r. P may know r either by having
encrypted all the values used to compute C or by computing it via the decryption
key f. To recover x, V computes
x =
(Cr n mod n2) 1
n
(A.3)
P can also recover random help r fromC = E(x;r) = (1+xn)rn (mod n2) by use
of the secret decryption key f as follows. (Note that our computations are modulo
n and not modulo n2 because r was taken from Z
n.)
r =Cn 1 (mod f) (mod n)
= (1+xn)n 1 (mod f)rnn 1 (mod f) (mod n) (A.4)
= 1r1 (mod n)
47A.3.2 Uniqueness of Encryptions
Paillier’s encryption scheme uses a bijection from (ZnZ
n) ! Z
n2 [55]. 22 Thus
any integer in Z
n2 represents a single valid encryption of an integer x 2 Zn with
randomhelpvaluer2Z
n.Consequently,ifC=E(x;r),C6=E(x0;r0)foranyx0 2Zn
and r0 6= r. (This requires, as stated above, that gcd(n;j(n)) = 1.)
P can attempt to cheat by providing a different random help value r0. Using r0 in-
stead of r in (A.3) will yield a different but invalid “decryption” x0. V must therefore
verify the provided value r0 is consistent with the known encryptionC. This is done
by re-encrypting the derived value x0 asC0 =E(x0;r0) and rejecting r0 unlessC0 =C.
A.4 Mathematical Operations on Encrypted Values
The following deﬁnitions apply to any values encrypted as above, such as bids, de-
posit amounts, or desired quantities. These properties are due to the homomorphic
properties of Paillier’s encryption scheme [55]. In these deﬁnitions we refer to a
prover P who has the decryption key or all random help values for encrypted data,
(generally the auctioneer), and a veriﬁer V who does not.
Addition. Addition of two encrypted values:
E(x)E(y) = E(x+y) (mod n2)
Adding a constant k to an encrypted value x is easily done by encrypting k with the
random help value 1 and multiplying the two encryptions.
E(x)(1+kn) = E(x+k) (mod n2)
Multiplication or division by a constant. Division is only possible when k is
invertible 23 mod n2.
(E(x))k = E(xk) (mod n2)
(E(x))1=k = E(x=k) (mod n2)
Negation. Implied by multiplication by a constant.
(E(x)) 1 = E( x) (mod n2)
22 Zn is the set of integers [0;n); Z
n is the subset of Zn relatively prime to n.
23 This is no impediment, as ﬁnding a noninvertible k is tantamount to breaking the security
key.
48Comparison to a constant k. P can prove any encryption C = E(k;r) is an en-
cryption of k by revealing the help value r used to encrypt C. V then veriﬁes that
(1+nk)rn =C (mod n2), because
E(k;r) = (1+n)krn (mod n2) (A.5)
This is of particular interest when k = 0. We remark that no encryption of a value
other than zero is an nth residue 24 mod n2.
24 To say that x is an nth residue (mod m) means that there exists some value g such that
x = gn (mod m). See also Footnote 14.
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Time to perform basic operations
Operation Time (s.) Time (s.)
(1024-bit) (2048-bit)
Computation of rn 0.045 0.287
Encryption 0.045 0.287
Decryption with r 0.045 0.287
Decryption with f 0.014 0.089
Decryption with rn 0.000 0.001
Constructing a TS 3.01 19.32
Verifying a TS 3.00 19.30
Proving 0  x < 2t given TS 0.001 0.001
Verifying proof of 0  x < 2t 0.070 0.41
Table 2
Time to prepare and verify auctions
Operation Number of Bids
100 1000 10000
Single-item Auctions
Preparation (1024-bit) 2.1 hr 21 hr 8.7 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 25 min 4.2 hr 42 hr
Preparation (2048-bit) 13.4 hr 5.6 days 56 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 2.7 hr 27 hr 11 days
Multi-item Auctions
Preparation (1024-bit) 4.2 hr 42 hr 17.5 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 52 min 8.7 hr 3.6 days
Preparation (2048-bit) 27 hr 11.2 days 112 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 5.4 hr 54 hr 22 days
50Table 3
Veriﬁcation of Vickrey payments for multi-item auctions
Operation Number of Bids
100 1000 10000
Preparation (1024-bit) 48 min 8 hr 3.3 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 72 min 12 hr 5 days
Preparation (2048-bit) 5.1 hr 51 hr 21 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 7.7 hr 77 hr 32 days
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Summary of Notation Employed in This Article
Cryptographic Operations
SignE(x) Entity E’s digital signature on a message x. (E is typically AU (the
auctioneer) or an integer i, representing bidder Bi.)
ComE(x) Entity E’s binding, hiding cryptographic commitment to a value x.
Comi Bidder Bi’s commitment to an encryption of her bid and her share
of random data used for the correctness proofs. See Section 17.
EK(x;r) An encryption of a message x with encryption key K and random
help value r.
EK(x) An encryption of a message x with encryption key K and where
the random help value is unimportant.
E(x;r);E(x) Encryptions of x as above where the encryption key is implied by
context.
E(x)E(y) It can be proven, using the two encryptions E(x) and E(y), that
xy, without revealing anything else about x and y. A similar cor-
respondence between the respective operations on encrypted val-
ues ;; and operations on their plaintexts ;>;<.
E(x)  E(y) It can similarly be proven, using the two encryptions E(x) and
E(y), that x = y, without revealing anything else about x and y.
(a  b (mod n), on unencrypted values, indicates that a and b are
equivalent modulo n.)
SiSj The exclusive OR (XOR) operation applied to two bit-strings Si
and Sj.
Mathematical
Concepts
Z The integers.
Zn The integers modulo n.
Z
n The multiplicative group of integers modulo n, i.e. the set of inte-
gers relatively prime to n.
52Entities
AU The auctioneer conducting the auction.
B =
fB1;:::;Bkg
B is the set of all bidders Bi.
B i The set of all bidders excluding Bi. Other sources may notate this
as Bni.
P A prover who proves a mathematical fact, typically the auctioneer.
V A veriﬁer who veriﬁes a claim made by a prover P.
Values
Bidi Bidder Bi’s bid. This is assumed to be private information.
Qtyi Bidder Bi’s desired quantity for items in a multi-item auction. This
is assumed private.
Qty
i Bidder Bi’s allocated quantity for items in the outcome of a multi-
item auction.
V(B) The total revenue in the auction with all bidders.
V(B i) The total revenue in the marginal economy with bidder Bi re-
moved.
l The total number of items available in a multi-item auction.
lmax The maximum allocation of items to any bidder.
li The number of items allocated to bidder Bi.
a The index of the ﬁrst bidder who receives a zero allocation in a
multi-item auction; bidders 1 through a  1 are allocated items.
Ci = E(Bidi) The encrypted form of Bi’s bid. This is assumed public.
Ri A receipt given to Bi showing her bid was received.
SAU;Si Random data strings committed to by the auctioneer and bidders
before the auction, and later used to ensure fairness when the auc-
tion’s outcome is proven correct.
vi Bidder Bi’s private value for the items bid for in the auction.
T The time a time-lapse cryptography service reveals a decryption
key.
n;f The Paillier keys used to encrypt and decrypt bids, respectively.
Typically, n= pq where p and q are large primes, and f =j(n)=
(p 1)(q 1), the size of Z
n. j is Euler’s totient function.
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